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People v. Lawrence (2008) , Cal.App.4th
[No. B193831. Second Dist., Div. Seven. Jan. 2, 2008.]
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RINGO LAWRENCE, Defendant and Appellant.

(Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BA284590, Mark V. Mooney, Judge.)

Rather than agree to a two-week trial continuance requested by his defense counsel due to a scheduling conflict, Ringo Lawrence, charged with two serious drug offenses, asserted his Sixth Amendment right under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta) to represent himself.

After a half-day of jury selection, Lawrence thought better of his decision and asked that counsel be appointed to represent him at trial. The trial court denied the request and also denied a second request made by Lawrence at the conclusion of jury selection.

Did the trial court err in refusing to permit Lawrence to withdraw his Faretta waiver? If so, is the erroneous denial of a request to withdraw a Faretta waiver state law error only or is it federal constitutional error? If federal constitutional error, is that error structural or subject to harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705] (Chapman)?

Under the circumstances of this case the trial court abused its discretion in denying Lawrence's request for counsel at the end of the first day of trial. Because deprivation of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal trial is federal constitutional error that affects the framework within which the trial proceeds, "with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate," the error is structural and reversal is required without analysis of prejudicial effect. (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 282 [113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182]; see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. ___, ___ [126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409].)