CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: COPS INVOLVED IN HIGH SPEED CHASES GET QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BINGUE v. PRUNCHAK
In Onossian v. Block, we applied the Supreme Court's decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), and held that a police officer in a high-speed chase-whether he injures the fleeing suspect or a bystander-is entitled to qualified immunity unless his behavior "shocks the conscience" because it demonstrates an intent "to cause harm
unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest." 175 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We were not called upon to consider whether the district court must apply this "intent to harm" standard to all high-speed chases, or only those chases that involve "emergencies" or "split-second decisions." Today we refine our Onossian analysis and hold, following the Eighth Circuit, that police officers involved in all high-speed chases are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the plaintiff can prove that the officer acted with a deliberate intent to harm. See Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
The officer involved in the high-speed chase in this case is entitled to summary judgment based on step one of the qualified immunity analysis as set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194 (2001). We thus reverse the judgment of the district court.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that high-speed police chases, by their very nature, do not give the officers involved adequate time to deliberate in either deciding to join the chase or how to drive while in pursuit of the fleeing suspect. We hold, therefore, that Lewis requires us to apply the "intent to harm" standard to all high-speed chases. Since Prunchak's actions do not meet this stringent standard, Bingue's claim fails under the first step of the Saucier analysis and Prunchak is entitled to dismissal. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for an entry of judgment for Prunchak on the § 1983 claims.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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