June 18, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: DELAY CAUSING PREJUDICE, NO JUSTIFICATION, REQUIRES DISMISSAL

So there was a little, teeny, tiny preaccusation delay bringing this case. Like 26 years! Really.

In 1981, the DA filed attempted murder in San Diego and got an arrest warrant. In 1982, the defendant was arrested in Pennsylvania and waived extradition, but the DA couldn't find the victim so the defendant was released and was told the case was dismissed. The defendant was denied disability benefits in 2007 because of the still outstanding arrest warrant, so he tried to clear this up.

Oops, the DA decided to proceed. Evidence was lost and the victim's memory was unclear, so the defense was able to show prejudice. Since the DA did nothing for 25 of the 26 years after the defendant was arrested in Pennsylvania, there's no justification for the delay. The dismissal for violation of state speedy trial and federal due process rights is affirmed.

Um, how much taxpayer money was spend having to defend this case?

People v. Mirenda; 2009 DJ DAR 8732; DJ, 6/18/09; C/A 4th

June 17, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: IMPROPERLY BARRING THE DEFENSE FROM IMPEACHING THE VICTIM WARRANTS REVERSAL

The defendant was convicted of molesting an 11-year old girl. The defense sought to impeach the victim with evidence that she had advanced knowledge of sexual activities, and told others how sexually attractive she was (she said that a neighborhood boy wanted to "hump her brains
out").

The California trial court excluded this evidence. The 9th circuit grants habeas relief, finding that this violated the defendant's 6th Amendment right of confrontation. The court points out that this evidence was clearly relevant to impeach the victim's credibility.

Holley v. Yarborough; 2009 DJ DAR 8638; DJ, 6/17/09; 9th Cir. Fed C/A

June 4, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER MARY PREVOST NAMED TOP ATTORNEY BY SAN DIEGO MAGAZINE

The premiere issue of "Our City San Diego" has chosen San Diego Criminal Defense Lawyer Mary Frances Prevost as it's #1 choice for those seeking legal representation in the criminal arena in San Diego.

Click HERE to see the link, and view how "Our City San Diego" chose San Diego Criminal Defense Lawyer Mary Frances Prevost as it's top attorney for San Diego criminal defense.

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June 3, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: SAN FRANCISCO MAY PAY 4.5 MILLION TO WRONGFULLY CONVICTED MAN

ITS PAYBACK TIME FOR PROSECUTORS WHO BREAK THE LAW. SAN FRANCISCO CITIZENS WILL PAY FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/06/03/BATB17VOV1.DTL

Francisco officials have tentatively agreed to pay $4.5 million to a man who spent nearly 14 years in prison before a judge reversed his murder conviction, finding that city authorities had withheld evidence his attorneys said could have cleared him.

The payout to John "J.J." Tennison, 37, would be the largest settlement ever in San Francisco of a lawsuit related to police conduct, records show. It will go first to the Police Commission and then the Board of Supervisors for approval.

Tennison was freed in 2003 after a federal judge overturned his conviction for the August 1989 killing of 18-year-old Roderick "Cooley" Shannon. He had been serving a prison term of 25 years to life.

Another judge freed Tennison's co-defendant, Antoine Goff, who was serving 27 years to life. A Superior Court judge subsequently declared both men "factually innocent." They then sued in federal court, saying the city had violated their civil rights.

The city attorney's office reached a proposed settlement with Tennison last month, court documents show. Goff's suit is still pending and is scheduled to go to trial later this year.

Although the documents do not give the proposed sum in Tennison's settlement, sources familiar with the matter told The Chronicle that it was $4.5 million. The sources spoke on condition of anonymity because the agreement has not been formally approved.

Elliot Peters, one of Tennison's attorneys, would not discuss the details of any agreement. But he said, "John is going to be compensated for his 14 years in custody - he deserves it."

The city attorney and the lawyer for the two retired police investigators who arrested Tennison when he was 17 have denied that the city or police did anything wrong. Matt Dorsey, spokesman for City Attorney Dennis Herrera, declined to comment on any settlement.

Attorneys for Tennison and Goff have long argued that prosecutors and the two police investigators - Earl Sanders, later the chief of police, and Napoleon Hendrix - kept possibly exculpatory evidence from the defense at the time of trial and afterward.

Tennison's team said the evidence included a post-trial confession of another man and the earlier statement by a woman who indicated that the man may have been involved in Shannon's killing.

The courts found that other evidence the defense says San Francisco authorities never provided - including the existence of a $2,500 reward fund in the case - could have helped Tennison's attorneys challenge the credibility of the only eyewitnesses to the shooting, two girls ages 11 and 14.

Jim Quadra, a private attorney retained by the city to represent Hendrix and Sanders, declined to discuss the settlement but stressed that his clients had acted properly.

"They deny vehemently that they did anything wrong," Quadra said.

Judge found case weak

In freeing Tennison, U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken concluded not only that authorities had withheld key evidence from the defense, but also that the prosecution's case was weak to begin with.

"No physical evidence was presented at trial tying Tennison to Shannon's shooting," she said. "The prosecution's entire case was dependent upon the testimony of ... two young girls whose eyewitness identifications of Tennison were questionable."

Wilken has served as the judge in Tennison's and Goff's lawsuits as well. In the civil case, she rejected some of the same claims that she had cited in releasing Tennison and left only three issues in dispute.

One was the issue of the existence of the "secret" $2,500 reward fund. Defense attorneys said they could have used its existence to challenge witnesses' credibility.

Quadra said police had given a memo mentioning the reward fund to prosecutor George Butterworth, an assertion disputed by Tennison's attorney. "Butterworth did not know about the secret memo," Peters said.

In any event, Quadra said, no money was paid out.

Late confession

The second issue involved the circumstances surrounding the post-trial, taped confession of Lovinsky Ricard. Butterworth admitted the existence of the tape during a hearing on the motion by Tennison's defense for a new trial in May 1991. He said he had just gotten the tape the day before.

Quadra said former inspectors Sanders and Hendrix had never known about the confession, which Ricard made to another investigator, or about the tape's existence. Tennison's attorneys argued that Sanders and Hendrix had known about the tape for seven months but withheld it from prosecutors.

Ricard ultimately asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions in the civil case.

The third issue concerned the account provided by the woman who had earlier told Sanders and Hendrix that Ricard might have been involved.

Tennison's attorneys said they had not known about the statement by Chante Smith until years after the trial. Butterworth suggested he had not fully understood the account of the interview he got from police, but that he had still given it to the defense.

Wilken ruled that a jury should sort out the dispute.

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: SAN FRANCISCO MAY PAY 4.5 MILLION TO WRONGFULLY CONVICTED MAN" »

May 20, 2009

SAN DIEGO POLICE OFFICER DAMON SMITH WITHHOLDS EVIDENCE IN CASES

OCEANSIDE — Some convicts could get new trials because an Oceanside police officer withheld some taped interviews in cases dating to 2001, it was reported Tuesday.

Officer Damon Smith, who disclosed that he had some recordings in his locker that were not entered into evidence as part of a domestic violence case in April, apparently failed to turn over some interviews with suspects and witnesses ever since he was hired eight years ago, the North County Times reported.

"We are gathering information so that we may complete a legal analysis of the issues and take appropriate action," Paul Levikow of the District Attorney's Office told the Times.

In criminal proceedings, all evidence must be made available over to both sides.

"These are highly significant tapes to be left out of the criminal justice process – and eight years is mind-boggling," San Diego County Public Defender Steve Carroll said.

Prosecutors are reviewing the tapes and plan to turn them over to their defense attorneys, who could argue for new trials.

The defense attorney in the domestic violence case said that Smith may have kept the tapes as backup in the event that someone filed a complaint against him. The officer, who was a homicide detective for a while, was involved in the investigation of the shooting death of Oceanside police Officer Dan Bessant, but there was no evidence he failed to turn over recordings in that case.

Still, the tapes prompted a delay in sentencing gang member Meki Gaono in Bessant's 2006 slaying. The sentencing, which had been set for this week, was put off until June 4.

Smith was unavailable for comment on Monday. It was unclear what discipline he might face.

May 15, 2009

ANONYMOUS CALL, NO SOURCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE, NO PROBLEM

Well, the outrage of the week has three actual outrages in it. The police get an anonymous call of a disturbance outside a house, and maybe one guy has a gun. The police respond and see the defendant and another, and try to detain them. The defendant resists arrest.

First issue: the detention is unlawful under Florida v. J.L. (529 U.S. 266). The Court of Appeal relies on Dolly (40 Cal.4th 458) and finds the facts here just like those in Dolly, and affirms. Right, except for that little J.L. case, with facts right on point.

Second issue: Harvey-Madden. If we demand it, the DA has to bring in somebody to prove the call wasn't stiffed in by the police. Oh, no problem, the level of detail here means that the caller was either the officer himself or the dispatcher was clairvoyant. The point of the rule is to avoid the police calling these in themselves, and you're just assuming that the police didn't do that.

Third issue: even if there wasn't reasonable cause to detain, the defense can't get suppression. Why not? Well, the defendant committed a crime. The crime, of course, is resisting arrest. Lots of officers saw it. The defendant's decision to commit a new crime, you guessed it, dissipates the taint of any preceding illegality. Come on.

In re Richard G.; 2009 DJ DAR 6883; DJ, 5/14/09; C/A 2nd, Div. 6

May 8, 2009

SAN DIEGO DUI DEFEWNSE: DRUNK DRIVING CONVICTION REVERSED FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

When's the last time you saw a case holding that there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to convict the defendant of DUI? Maybe never? The defendant didn't stop his truck behind the limit line at an intersection, with perhaps half the truck over the line before the defendant stopped. The offficer (this is obviously a pretext stop, a point never discussed) stops the defendant. The defendant shows signs of methamphetamine intoxication: rigid muscles, dilated pupils, sweating, etc. But the point is that there's no evidence that any of this ACTUALLY AFFECTED the defendant's driving. Yes, it could have. But there has to actually be evidence that it did. The only bad driving was trivial. Case reversed on insufficiency of the evidence!

People v. Torres; 2009 DJ DAR 6490; DJ, 5/6/09; C/A 4th

April 29, 2009

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT:EVIDENCE OF SELF-INCRIMINATION ASSERTION

People v. Waldie (4th Dist., 4/24/09, E042303) 09 C.D.O.S. 4980

Error (harmless here under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24) for Riverside County Judge Albert J. Wojcik to allow prosecutor to introduce evidence of prearrest silence and then to argue it.

Police were allowed to testify that defendant never participated in police interview even after he was called a dozen times. Judge instructed jury that it showed consciousness of guilt. In closing argument, prosecutor commented that defendant had not cooperated with police investigation. Evidence and argument violated Fifth Amendment because defendant was deprived of meaningful right to refuse to talk to police.

"If the police are allowed to call a subject persistently and then offer his unwillingness to response as evidence of guilt, a defendant would never be able to claim the protection of the freedom of incrimination ... testimony about repeated phone calls and apparent evasiveness ... is constitutionally infirm." But see Jenkins v. California (1980) 447 U.S. 231 (prearrest silence may be used to impeach credibility).

How can this be "harmless error"? It deals with a Constitutional right!

April 25, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: ILLEGALLY PROLONGED DETENTION? NO PROBLEM

In a week with perhaps the best case of the year (Arizona), we also get an outrage of the week, perhaps the outrage of the year. The California Court of Appeal has to really struggle even to come up with a traffic infraction to justify the detention in this case; get this, the headlights were out of alignment.

ARE YOU KIDDING?

Alrighty, then. But the detention was illegally prolonged, under McGaughran (25 Cal.3d 577). Atwater (532 U.S. 318) says that the 4th Amendment isn't violated by a state law permitting a custodial arrest for a fine-only infraction.

This California Court of Appeal mangles Atwater and comes up with a rule that the 4th Amendment permits custodial arrests for infractions, and concludes that McGauhran isn't the law, so illegally prolonged detentions don't require uppression under the 4th Amendment.

Don't believe me: "if the law enforcement officers had probable cause to believe defendant
committed traffic infractions, then detaining him longer than necessary to simply cite him did not violate the Fourth Amendment." So they ignore a case from the California Supremes and essentially permit extended detentions justified by the most trivial of traffic violations.

Oh, and they skillfully don't even mention the binding cases from the U.S. Supremes barring illegally prolonged detentions, U.S. v. Sharpe (470 U.S. 675) and U.S. v. Place (462 U.S. 696).

And anyway, what does the scope of a custodial arrest have to do with an illegally prolonged detention prior to an arrest? What was searched? Sure enough, the police searched the car after the defendant was arrested and removed from it, violating our new winner, Arizona v. Gant, just decided by SCOTUS.!

People v. Branner; 2009 DJ DAR 5507; DJ, 4/21/09; C/A 3rd

April 21, 2009

FORGETTING TO PROCESS AN APPEAL:OOPS

So the defendant here was convicted in 2005. He filed a timely notice of appeal. In 2005. The Amador clerk, ah, "filed and forgot" the appeal, and finally found it and sent it to the C/A in 2008. The C/A is not amused, though what they actually say is that they're sure this won't
ever happen again. They do note that in 1935, the mishandling of a timely notice of appeal resulted in defendant Rush Griffin being executed before his appeal could be heard. This led to the automatic appeal procedure now used in capital cases.

People v. Grimes; 2009 DJ DAR 3969; DJ, 3/18/09; C/A 3rd

April 21, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: BAD OBSERVATION POST CASE

It seems that every few years we get an observation post case. Here's this year's bad boy. The officer watched a claimed drug sale from a surveillance location. The DA claimed the EC 1040 privilege.

The court sustained the privilege and imposed no sanction. We ought to be winning these, but here we lose. The Court of Appeal stresses that the trial court here permitted extensive cross about distance and angle of view and only barred questions about the exact location where the ofr. was when he saw what he claimed to have seen.

Here is a critical point that we have to emphasize: essentially, the defense was only barred from asking the ultimate question. But the Court of Appeal goes nuts, trying tomake the distinction between relevance and materiality. Sure, it would be relevant to know where the officer made the observations from.

But material? The Court of Appeal finds lack of materiality because the officer's testimony about observations from the location were sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence, so there was no realistic possibility that disclosure would have enabled the def. to raise a
reasonable doubt.

Right, we're sure the defendant is guilty, so nothing you slimy defense lawyers could do would do you any good anyway, so we're just not going to let you do it. Nothing like a presumption of guilt.

People v. Lewis; 2009 DJ DAR 5321; DJ, 4/15/09; C/A 1st

April 21, 2009

SHOWING HARMFUL MATTER TO A MINOR (What's "Harmful?)

The defendant here was convicted of showing harmful matter to a minor in violation of California Penal Code sec. 288.2. The Court of Appeal says that "harmful matter" doesn't require that an
average adult would find the material patently offensive and unsuitable for minors.

The Court of Appeal says that the test is the 3-prong Miller (413 U.S.15) test, that the average person, applying community standards, would find that the work appeals to prurient interest, the work depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and the work as a whole lacks serious literary value.

The defendant here showed the minor two TV shows, one showing a naked woman dancing, the second a torso only shot of a man and a woman having sex. I think this sounds like standard cable TV fare, but of course the Court of Appeal finds sufficient evidence that this
qualifies as "harmful matter."

People v. Dyke; 2009 DJ DAR 5213; DJ, 4/10/09; C/A 1st

April 21, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: HARASSING PAROLE SEARCHES ARE DANDY

The officer contacted the defendant and found out that he was on parole. Sanders (31 Cal.4th 318) permits a parole search. The only limitation on that search is em>Reyes (19 Cal.4th 743), which says that the search can't be arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.

The defense claims that this was a public strip search, and was thus harassing. The Court of Appeal goes to some pains to rule that this was not a public strip search. The search, though in public, was conducted in the back of a hotel parking lot in an area that didn't face the street.

They describe the search as the officer. lowering the defendant's pants a foot or so, then pulling back the elastic waistband of his underwear, permitting a visual search of his crotch area. The
only item of clothing the officer removed was the defendant's belt, the defendant's private parts were not exposed, and there's no evidence the officer touched the defendant's private area, he simply retrieved the bag of drugs. We're going to have to argue that had the officer done much more than this, it would qualify as harassing.

People v. Smith; 2009 DJ DAR 5224; DJ, 4/10/09; C/A 1st

April 11, 2009

CALIFORNIA DRUNK DRIVING LAW: DRUNK BOATING AND CAUSATION

The Daily Journal Headlines on this case was, "Defendant must answer charges where court finds that death due to jump off of reversing boat was foreseeable harm." Huh?

So the defendant was driving a boat. The victim was very drunk and kept demanding to water ski. Folks told him not to, but as the def. was backing the boat up, the victim jumped into the
water and the propeller killed him.

The magistrate dismissed the case and the post-information court upheld that dismissal. The Court of Appeal reverses. They say that this is a causation issue. Where, as here, there's an intervening cause of the injury, the issue is whether the type of harm inflicted was foreseeable and thus within the risk of harm created by the def.'s negligent conduct.

I have trouble seeing any negligence by the defendant here, but the Court of Appeal assures us that the victim was very drunk and out of control, so the defendant, as the captain of the ship,
had the responsibility to folks on board, especially the out of control and drunk ones.

OK, the defendant was drunk while boating, but how is it foreseeable that if you're drunk while driving a boat, somebody is going to jump out of the boat and get killed?People v. Dawson; 2009 DJ DAR 4969; DJ, 4/6/09; C/A 1st

April 11, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: ROBBERY OR GRAND THEFT PERSON?

This is a bad case on the difference between grand theft person and robbery. We say that a purse snatch is grand theft person. Is it? This Court of Appeal says that the issue is whether the defendant uses force to overcome the victim's resistance. Here the victim tried to hold onto the purse and the defendant overcame that resistance and stepped on the victim's foot, and that made this robbery, justifying the court's refusal to give an instruction on grand theft person.

Adding a step on the foot elevates the purse snatching to robbery. Hmmm.

People v. Burns; 2009 DJ DAR 5159; DJ, 4/9/09; C/A 2nd, Div. 4

April 5, 2009

IMPROPER DENIAL OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IS NOT A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS

The Illinois trial court refused to allow defense counsel to exercise a peremptory challenge. This could happen in California for the same reason: the judge found that exercise of the challenge would violate Batson (476 U.S. 79) as being discriminatory. But the trial judge's
refusal to allow the challenge was wrong.

The U.S. Supremes have previously ruled that peremptory challenges are not required by the U.S. Constitution. Here, they hold that state law governs the consequences of improper denial of peremptory challenges; such an improper denial is just not a federal due process violation.

Rivera v. Illinois; 2009 DJ DAR 4822; DJ, 4/1/09; US Supremes

March 31, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: SECOND-DEGREE FELONY MURDER AND MERGER

We are not in a common law state, there are no common law crimes. Right? Well, not so fast. There is second-degree felony murder, a crime wholly made up by the Supremes. The Supremes here try to put this problem to rest by claiming that they really didnit make up this crime.

They claim that implied malice, based on the abandoned and malignant heart language in PC 188, really does make second-degree felony murder a crime. Right. Anyway, this analysis compels the court to limit second-degree felony murder to inherently dangerous felonies, inherently dangerous in the abstract, regardless of the actual facts of any specific crime. OK.

But then the court turns to the merger doctrine. Essentially, this is really a simple idea. Picture, if you will, a defendant shooting a victim. During the time that the bullet is in the air, the crime is attempted murder or at least ADW. If the bullet misses, you have at least an ADW. If it hits and kills the victim, you have murder.

Now is this a felony murder, the felony being the ADW? You can see that this approach would turn every murder into felony murder. In Ireland (70 Cal.2d 522), the Supremes
recognized this, and articulated a doctrine of merger: the ADW merges into the murder, so the ADW canit be a felony triggering the felony-murder rule. Seems obvious?

Well, for the past 20 years, the Supremes have been cutting back on Ireland. There was a point where I thought that my little ADW hypo was the only piece of Ireland left. We had cases all over the place, with clearly inconsistent rules. Even the Supremes finally admit this. So they announce that they've decided to settle and clarify this area.

Run for the hills! It seems that every time the Supremes announce that they are going to
clarify and settle, they instead obfuscate and confuse. But not this time. They adopt a clear rule: When the underlying felony is assaultive in nature,... we now conclude that the felony merges with the homicide and cannot be the basis of a felony-murder instruction.i And a felony is assaultive based on the elements of the felony, not the facts of the case.

Pretty great. But wait, exactly what are assaultive felonies? Well, we can't expect everything; they decline to tell us. Certainly, PC 246, shooting at an occupied vehicle, is an assaultive felony, because the Supremes so state. This is a big win, how big remains to be seen.

People v. Chun; 2009 DJ DAR 4745; DJ, 3/31/09; Cal. Supremes

March 26, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: NO "CUSTODY" FOR MIRANDA PURPOSES AT WORK

The Defendant was instructed to follow police to room in office space where he worked while his office, home and car were being searched (with a warrant).

He was questioned with the door closed, but specifically told he was not under arrest, and that he would walk out when "we're done," but was not told he was free to leave.

The questioning was mostly friendly, though at one point the defendant asked the officer not to yell. Held, he was not in custody.

Was he really free to leave having been instructed (otherwise known as "ordered") to go to the office, placed in a closed room, and told he could leave "when we're done" (the converse of which is you can't leave until I am through with you)? Yeah, right.

United States v. Bassignani (9th Cir., 3/25/09, 07-10453) 09 C.D.O.S. 3766

March 26, 2009

FEDERAL WIRETAPPING AND STANDING

Even though the trial court erred in ruling that the Defendant did not have standing to complain of a violation of wiretap laws in the monitoring of her boyfriend's phone, which she also used, Defendant was not entitled to suppression because "Ms. Ahamad never sought a hearing based on the claim federal law enforcement authorities utilized the drug trafficking warrant as a stratagem to discover evidence relating to the shooting of Mr. Larrainzar.

Nor did Ms. Ahamad challenge the federal court disclosure orders which resulted in the Los Angeles homicide detectives learning of the ongoing federally authorized electronic surveillance."

People v. Reyes (2nd Dist., 3/24/09, B201294) 09 C.D.O.S. 3803

March 12, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: PROSECUTORS CAN'T APPEAL THEIR OWN DISMISSAL

Where prosecutors moved to dismiss misdemeanor charges against defendant due to lack of evidence after trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, prosecutors could not appeal adverse ruling on suppression motion.

People v. Gallagher - filed January 30, 2009, San Mateo Superior Court, Cite as 2009 SOS 1525

March 8, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: COMPARATIVE JURY ANALYSIS

This defendant was sentenced to the death penalty in San Diego in 1995. Out of 77 prospective jurors, only 6 were African-American. The DA kicked off all 6.

The California Supreme Court upholds this against a Wheeler (22 Cal.3d 258) and
Batson (476 U.S. 79) challenge. Of note, they do comparative juror analysis, comparing jurors kicked off with jurors kept. In Lenix, 44 Cal.4th 602, the California SUpreme Court finally gave up the ghost and agreed that the U.S. Supreme Court compels comparative juror analysis. You can see in this case how little good that does us.

In fact, in my last jury trial in Vista, the judge refused to even engage in any analysis. So, as you can see, applying the law is fairly impossible when the courts want to produce a particular result.

People v. Hamilton; 2009 DJ DAR 2498; DJ, 2/24/09; California Supreme Court.

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March 7, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: EVIDENCE THAT CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH A FELLOW GANG MEMBER IS NOT ENOUGH TO PROVE CRIMES WERE GANG RELATED

Appellant and his fellow gang member committed four robberies on Christmas Day 2000, the robberies resulting in minimal proceeds.

At trial, Briceno stipulated that Hard Times was a street gang and that on 12/25/2000, he actively participated in the Hard Times criminal street gang with knowledge that members have engaged in criminal gang activity, as defined in Penal Code section 186.22. He specifically did not stipulate that he aided and abetted another gang member on that date.

An expert testified generally as to the gang but provided no testimony establishing Briceno’s specific intent in committing the robberies. Briceno was convicted of the robberies with the gang enhancement. The federal appellate court found that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to find proof of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt as there was no showing that Briceno committed the crimes with the specific intent to promote the gang -- mere membership in a gang alone is insufficient to prove that the crime was for the gang’s benefit.

(Garcia v. Carey (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1099.) The court ordered the habeas petition as to imposition of the enhancements granted.


February 25, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: JOINDER & SEVERANCE AT TRIAL

JOINDER AND SEVERANCE

The two murders here were properly joined, as being of the same class of crimes. Even properly joinable offenses must be severed, however, on a showing of prejudice.

There's a four-factor test: (1) would the evidence be cross-admissible?; (2) are some of the charges inflammatory?; (3) is a weak case being bolstered by being joined with a strong case or another weak case?; and (4) is one charge a capital charge?

This case focuses on the cross-admissibility issue. The California Supreme Court rules that there's enough of a showing that each of the murders establishes intent to permit one murder to be used to prove intent in the other murder.

There is an interesting concurring and dissenting opinion by Kennard.

People v. Soper; 2009 DJ DAR 2335; DJ, 2/20/09; Cal. Supremes

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February 24, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: IT'S OK TO IMPOSE GPS DEVICE ON JUVENILE AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION

OK TO IMPOSE GPS DEVICE ON JUVENILE AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION

The minor was found a delinquent ward of the juvenile court for receiving stolen property for the benefit of a criminal street gang and vandalism for the gang. The court said this was a camp case, but instead ordered home on probation with conditions.

One of those conditions was that the minor wear a global positioning system (GPS) device. The Court of Appeal upholds this condition. The Court that sometimes adults can have the wearing of a GPS device as a condition of probation, and if adults can be so ordered, so can juveniles. They claim that there's no invasion of privacy, because it just tells where he is,
it doesn't intrude on his actual conversations.

They do stress that this was imposed as a less harsh alternative, so maybe we can limit this to
that situation.

In re R.V.; 2009 DJ DAR 2383; DJ, 2/20/09; C/A 1st

February 24, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY, THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, AND CASUAL REMARKS

The California Supreme Court rules that admission of a statement made by a 3-year old, two months after the crime, failed to qualify as spontaneous, finding harmless error.

But they reject the claim that this violated the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. They take some language from Crawford (541 U.S. 36) that testimonial hearsay, admission of which violates the Sixth Amendment, doesn't include a casual remark made to an acquaintance. They say that the US Supremes haven't defined what testimonial means.

I assume that this was written before Davis (547 US 813), where the U.S. Supremes explained that testimonial means description of a previous event, as opposed to an
ongoing emergency. Under Davis, this statement is clearly testimonial.

Facetious remark (because I'm posting this on Saturday, and I stole it from Al Menaster)

Hey, let's pretend the later case never happened, so we can take some language from an earlier case to affirm a death sentence.

People v. Gutierrez; 2009 DJ DAR 2353; DJ, 2/20/09; Cal. Supremes

Continue reading "SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY, THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, AND CASUAL REMARKS" »

February 24, 2009

JUDGE CAN ONLY GO SO FAR WHEN QUESTIONING WITNESSES

HERE'S AN OLDIE, BUT A GOODIE.

The trial court extensively cross-examined defense witnesses, repeatedly disparaged defense witnesses, and belabored points of evidence adverse to the defense. This was intervening by the court as an adversary to such an extent that it violated the rule that the trial court cannot align itself with the prosecutor.

People v. Santana (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1194
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February 23, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: ONE ROBBERY, HOW MANY VICTIMS?

How many counts can we come up with? One potato, two potato, three potato?

The defendants robbed a McDonald's. (OMG, why?) Two of the employees saw the robbers with guns and hid throughout the robbery. The robbers forced the manager to open the safe
and give the robbers the money, which hich had a tracking device which led the police to the defendants.

So is this three counts of robbery or only one? Of course, the Supremes say that it's three. Constructive possession, they say, yada, yada, yada. Just to show you how absurd this is, one defendant was sentenced to 116 years to life.

People v. Scott; 2009 DJ DAR 2347; DJ, 2/20/09; Cal. Supremes

February 13, 2009

SANTA CLARA PROSECUTOR FOUND TO HAVE ENGAGED IN EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT WILL GET TO KEEP HIS JOB; ASKS TAXPAYERS TO PAY FOR HIS DEFENSE

MERCURY NEWS
Posted: 02/12/2009 06:18:41 PM PST

Despite a state bar finding that prosecutor Ben Field engaged in widespread misconduct (click
HERE for previous article), Santa Clara County District Attorney Dolores Carr said Thursday that she will keep her deputy on the job while he appeals a state bar judge's order that could strip him of his law license for four years.

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Carr said Thursday that she cannot comment on specifics of the judge's ruling because the case is continuing to unfold, adding only, "I absolutely respect the state bar court's authority to make its judgment in Ben Field's case." But she said that Field has a right to remain a prosecutor as he pursues his legal appeals, and "we'll assess an appropriate place for him in the office."

Click HERE for prior story on how the prosecutor's office is trying to shield this creep.

COMMENTARY: Let me guess. The taxpayers get to keep him on, pay his salary, pay for his defense. I'll bet the DA is even going to promote this goon. Can I sue him, please?

For more recent state bar actions against prosecutors, click HERE.

Continue reading "SANTA CLARA PROSECUTOR FOUND TO HAVE ENGAGED IN EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT WILL GET TO KEEP HIS JOB; ASKS TAXPAYERS TO PAY FOR HIS DEFENSE" »

February 13, 2009

STATE BAR OPINION: PROSECUTOR SHOULD BE SUSPENDED FOR FOUR YEARS

MERCURY NEWSPosted: 02/11/2009 11:47:52 AM PST

Suggesting the harshest disciplinary punishment in recent history for a California prosecutor, a state bar judge Wednesday called for Santa Clara County Deputy District Attorney Ben Field to be stripped of his right to practice law in the state for four years because he "abused his prosecutorial power.''

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In a scathing 67-page ruling, Judge Pat McElroy described Field as an "overzealous'' prosecutor who violated a host of ethical rules in four criminal cases, ranging from disobeying judges' orders to hiding crucial evidence from defense lawyers that could help their clients. The judge's decision was based on a series of hearings held last year in which bar prosecutors charged Field with a string of misconduct in cases dating back to 1995, and she largely accepted the prosecution's depiction of the case against Field.

McElroy, however, took the extraordinary step of recommending punishment more severe than prosecutors had sought. Bar prosecutors had recommended that Field be suspended from practicing law for three years, ordinarily the stiffest penalty handed down in discipline cases short of disbarring an attorney.

"His overzealousness to convict and punish defendants who had murdered, robbed and raped obstructed his understanding of a prosecutor's special duty to promote justice and seek truth,'' the judge wrote.

Continue reading "STATE BAR OPINION: PROSECUTOR SHOULD BE SUSPENDED FOR FOUR YEARS" »

February 7, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: OK FOR PROSECUTORS TO COMMENT ON DEFENSE FAILURE TO RETEST EVIDENCE

Here is yet another spectacularly awful case from the California Supreme Court relating to defense experts. In Zamudio (43 Cal.4th 327), the California Supreme Court said that the DA could present evidence that an item had been provided to the defense laboratory.

In this case, the DA repeatedly asked witnesses whether the sheriff's DNA lab could have been ordered to release samples to the defense for testing. Notably, the trial judge actually sustained defense objections, noting that this raised questions about the credibility and competency of defense counsel, a point the Supremes ignore.

The Supremes say these questions weren't a violation of work product, since no "writing" from the defense was involved. They brush aside claims of attorney-client privilege (no communication from a client), Griffin (380 U.S. 609) error (OK to comment on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence), and that the questions shifted the burden of proof to the defense.

This is really, really bad and we're going to have to develop strategies to deal with it. Of curse, we must all demand that the court pay for the retesting of evidence from the prosecution. But we need more...much more.

People v. Bennett; 2009 DJ DAR 1429; DJ, 1/30/09; Cal. Supremes

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February 5, 2009

JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE TESTIFYING DEFENDANT FAILING TO EXPLAIN OR DENY

JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE TESTIFYING DEFENDANT FAILING TO EXPLAIN OR DENY

I have always hated this instruction because nomatter how thorough a defense attorney is in the presentation of his/her case, the court always gived this and prosecutors always use it to muddy the very clear waters.

The California Court of Appeal upholds the CALCRIM on this, 361, relying on the cases upholding the CALJIC. The Court of Appeal finds evidentiary support for giving this instruction, but besides objecting to it, point out, if you can, that your client didn't fail to explain or deny anything.

People v. Rodriguez; 2009 DJ DAR 1474; DJ, 1/30/09; C/A 2nd, Div. 4
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February 2, 2009

U.S. SUPREME COURT: MIGHT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE BE ELIMINATED?

I'm scared. I'm very, very scared. While I have always championed personal financial sanctions on police officers who violate the Fourth Amendment rather than exclusion of evidence (seems a stronger deterrent to me), the courts have historically thought otherwise. Now, if a cop violates your Fourth Amendment rights, the evidence he subsequently learns of as a result of the illegal search or seizure is suppressed and cannot beused in court against you.

Will our chief justice, who championed such causes in the past, lead the Supremes to total expungement of Fourth Amendment remedies?

Take a look at the URL below. Maybe so.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/31/washington/31scotus.html?_r=1


January 29, 2009

ATTEMPT CRIMES IN CALIFORNIA REQUIRE MORE THAN MERE PREPARATION

Attempt Crimes in California Still Require an Unequivocal Act beyond Mere Preparation

By Ted Cassman & Raphael Goldman

A recent decision of the California First District Court of Appeal provides a welcome refresher course concerning the crime of attempt. The case reinforces the principle that an attempt under California law requires more than mere preparation to commit a crime – there is no offense except when the defendant commits an unequivocal act or acts that, unless frustrated by some external circumstance, would result in the accomplishment of the intended offense.

In People v. Luna, No. A119768, __ Cal. Rptr. 3d __, 2009 WL 106660 (Jan. 15, 2009), the court considered the case of Manuel Luna, who was found driving a car that contained piping, glue, fittings, butane, a butane burner and approximately $1200 in cash – that is, all of the things necessary to manufacture hashish except for one crucial ingredient: “grocery bags full of marijuana.” Id. at * 1. Luna testified at trial that he bought the equipment with the intention of manufacturing hashish, but claimed that he never attempted to purchase marijuana after acquiring the equipment. Id. Luna was convicted under Penal Code § 664 of attempting to manufacture hashish in violation of Health & Safety Code § 11379.6.

“The elements of a criminal attempt are “[(1)] a specific intent to commit the crime, and [(2)] a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.” Id. at *2 (citing Penal Code § 21a; People v. Toledo 26 Cal. 4th 221, 229 (2001)). The Luna court observed that the first element was not in question because the appellant testified that it had been his intention to manufacture hashish when he purchased the equipment. Id. Thus, the key dispute [wa]s the second component of an attempt crime. That is, whether appellant’s actions had progressed to the point where they could be considered a direct but ineffectual act done towards [the crime’s] commission, i.e., an overt ineffectual act which is beyond mere preparation yet short of actual commission of the crime. Id. (quotation marks omitted, second alteration in original).

The Luna court noted the principle that “[w]here the intent to commit the crime is clearly shown, an act done toward the commission of the crime may be sufficient for an attempt even though that same act would be insufficient if the intent is not as clearly shown.” Id. at *3 (quoting People v. Bonner, 80 Cal. App. 4th 759, 764 (2000)). Nonetheless, even under that minimal standard, the court found evidence against Luna to be insufficient to support the attempt conviction.

The case turned on the question of whether Luna’s acts were merely preparation to commit a crime, or instead constituted a course of conduct that would have resulted in the commission of a crime absent some external intervention. The Luna court relied heavily on guidance from the California Supreme Court distinguishing mere preparation from acts that constitute attempt:

Continue reading "ATTEMPT CRIMES IN CALIFORNIA REQUIRE MORE THAN MERE PREPARATION" »

January 25, 2009

CONTRA COSTA PUBLIC DEFENDER CHALLENGES DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S USE OF ILLEGAL CLIENT RECORDINGS

Public defender challenges DA's use of jail phone conversations
By Malaika Fraley
Contra Costa Times
Posted: 01/25/2009 04:49:29 PM PST

MARTINEZ — Contra Costa County's top public defender says the District Attorney's Office is illegally using conversations recorded at jail pay phones to build criminal cases against defendants.

Public Defender David Coleman will go before a Contra Costa County judge Thursday to argue against prosecutors' use of phone calls in a challenge both sides say could ultimately make its way to higher courts.

Coleman contends that the District Attorney's Office's practice of listening to jail phone calls to gain information in criminal cases violates constitutional rights, state wiretapping laws and attorneys' professional codes of conduct. The district attorney's office says the practice is supported by legal precedent and calls Coleman's case "groundless."

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January 9, 2009

NO PRE-PRELIMINARY HEARING PITCHESS DISCOVERY

NO PRE-PRELIMINARY HEARING PITCHESS DISCOVERY

Out top appellate counsel in the California criminal defense community are litigating whether the right to pre-prelim. discovery survived Prop. 115, and we thought this case might resolve it. But nope. Instead, they hold that we can't ever get Pitchess (11 Cal.3d 531)
discovery prior to prelims.

They say that it's "unlikely" that Pitchess discovery would actually affect the prelim., which is merely a limited probable cause hearing. But what if we could make a showing that in
this particular case it IS likely that disclosure of citizen complaints against the police officers would cause the preliminary hearing magistrate to refuse to hold the defendant to answer or find a lesser?

You know, like when I found out that San Diego Police Officer Broxterman was removed from the DUI enforcement unit and then suddenly reappeared ten years later making the same illegal traffic stops that got him into trouble ten years prior? And the prosecutors didn't tell us about it? ANd now he is gong to testify n my prelim about a traffic stop and other (false) stuff, and I can't impeach him with the conplaints about him? hhhh. Hush. Hush.

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We still can't get discovery? What kind of rule is that? In any event, they can't now seriously claim that they are preserving testimony at this limited hearing where we can't find out much beforehand. California Public Defense Association appellate guru Mark Harvis is appellate counsel on this one. His writ petition was summarily denied the first time, after which the Cal. Supremes granted review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal. Mark will petition the Supremes again.

People v. Galindo; 2009 DJ DAR 313; DJ, 1/9/09; C/A 2nd, Div. 8


January 6, 2009

CONFLICT IN FLAT FEE RETAINER KILLS CLIENT

CONFLICT FOR FLAT FEE CONTRACT?

As you read this summary, keep in mind that the Cal. Supremes affirmed this death verdict; they vote to KILL this guy, in spite of what you are about to read.

This private lawyer sought total fees of $80,000 for himself and various experts, $60,000 of that for the experts. Granted. The deal was that whatever the lawyer didn't spend on experts, he could keep. Remarkably, the lawyer spent $9,000 on the experts, so he got to keep $71,000. He did that by, well, not using many experts. See any conflict of interest here?

Well, two justices (Kennard and Werdegar) do. But five don't. The majority reinvents the
standard of prejudice, but even under that standard this is an obvious conflict. Nope, says the majority, we just don't see anything the lawyer did that prejudiced the defendant. Really? How about not getting the experts he needed to save this guy's life? Oh, and note the
footnote (in the dissent) about defense counsel's "huge gambling debts," causing him to borrow money he never intended to repay, and resulting in a State Bar suspension in 2001 and his resignation from the State Bar in 2004.

Now if the court had affirmed a sentence of a $100 fine, it would still be wrong. But they vote to KILL this guy when his lawyer had gambling debts that he paid off by not getting experts so he could pocket the money, resulting in no investigation and no penalty phase
social study report. That, my friends, is an outrage.

People v. Doolin; 2009 DJ DAR 101; DJ, 1/6/09; Cal. Supremes

January 1, 2009

PROBATION CONDITIONS ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF PETS

In an ordinary case (this is possession of meth), can the court require probationers to notify probation which pets they currently have and of any change in their pet status? The majority says that pets can be dangerous to probation officers, or might bark or quack or something
and warn probationers that the probation officer is coming, so the probationers can destroy all that illegal stuff they always have around.

There's a dissent from Kennard and Moreno, apparently the only justices with any common sense. The dissent points out that the majority treats all pets as dangerous:

"Falling within that reach would be Jaws the goldfish, Tweety the canary, and Hank the hamster, hardly
the kinds of pets one would expect to strike fear in a probation
officer."

I guess they don't know some of the probation officers we know. You have to wonder about the judgment of the court in granting review and expending resources on this subject, while at the same time the court is trying to transfer death penalty appeals to the Court of Appeal because
they are so overwhelmed.

People v. Olguin; 2008 DJ DAR 18850; DJ, 12/30/08; Cal. Supremes

January 1, 2009

PROBATION CONDITIONS ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF PETS

In an ordinary case (this is possession of meth), can the court require probationers to notify probation which pets they currently have and of any change in their pet status? The majority says that pets can be dangerous to probation officers, or might bark or quack or something
and warn probationers that the probation officer is coming, so the probationers can destroy all that illegal stuff they always have around.

There's a dissent from Kennard and Moreno, apparently the only justices with any common sense. The dissent points out that the majority treats all pets as dangerous:

"Falling within that reach would be Jaws the goldfish, Tweety the canary, and Hank the hamster, hardly the kinds of pets one would expect to strike fear in a probation officer."

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I guess they don't know some of the probation officers we know. You have to wonder about the judgment of the court in granting review and expending resources on this subject, while at the same time the court is trying to transfer death penalty appeals to the Court of Appeal because
they are so overwhelmed.

People v. Olguin; 2008 DJ DAR 18850; DJ, 12/30/08; Cal. Supremes

January 1, 2009

THE POLICE CAN'T KEEP THE ONLY COPIES OF SEALED SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS

The Cal. Supremes here decide when the police can retain all the copies of a sealed Hobbs (7 Cal.4th 948) search warrant affidavit. Their answer effectively bars this.

To obtain an order to retain all copies, the police have to show that disclosure would endanger an informant, that security procedures at the clerk's office are inadequate, that police security procedures are adequate, that the police have procedures to ensure retention of the affidavit for 10 years, and the magistrate must make a sufficient record of the documents reviewed to make sure that later on everyone can tell what was reviewed.

That didn't happen here, so letting the police keep all the copies was error.

And when are the police EVER going to be able to show that the clerk's office leaks like a sieve? Never.

So what happens to this defendant? The Supremes find that it's not impossible to reconstruct what happened here. So they remand for a full hearing to determine whether meaningful appellate review of the actual affidavit is in fact possible. If not, apparently the
warrant gets quashed. The police can't keep the only copies of sealed search warrant
affidavits any more, and we can still seek suppression if what was in those affidavits can't be reconstructed.

People v. Galland; 2008 DJ DAR 18856; DJ, 12/30/08; Cal. Supremes

January 1, 2009

FAILURE TO ADVISE A DEFENDANT OF ALL OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS-CASE REVERSED

The officer here engaged in an extensive discussion with the defendant about his Miranda rights, mostly about advisements by police on television and the fact that the defendant had previously been advised of his rights.

The defendant waived and confessed. Oops, the officer left out one teeny tiny right, that anything the defendant said could be used against him.

The trial judge, of course, had no problem with this. imagine that.

Surprisingly, the Court of APpeal does have a problem with it. The defendant has to actually be advised of each of the four Miranda warnings, or the subsequent confession is no good. The AG argued harmless error, but the Court of Appeal disagrees and reverses.

People v. Bradford; 2008 DJ DAR 18881; DJ, 12/31/08; C/A 1st

December 30, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE NEWS: 3-STRIKES SENTENCE STRUCK DOWN AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

The 9th circuit here strikes down a 3-Strikes sentence as being in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause!

The crime here is failure of a registered sex offender to re-register within 5 days of his birthday. The court stresses that the defendant had been registering, hadn't moved, and the police knew where he was all the time. They evaluate the crime as pretty minimal.

The defendant has many serious violent and sex offenses, but they say that nothing about THIS crime shows any recidivist tendencies. Thus, they conclude that 28 years to life
violates the cruel and unusual clause.

AND THAT, MY FRIENDS, IS A GREAT START!

Gonzalez v. Duncan; 2008 DJ DAR ; DJ, 12/ /08; 9th Cir. Fed C/A
http://www.tinyurl.com/7ohl4n

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE NEWS: 3-STRIKES SENTENCE STRUCK DOWN AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT" »

December 27, 2008

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOUR TRIAL ATTORNEY RESIGNS FROM THE STATE BAR DURING YOUR TRIAL?

Here's how you can tell that you're having a bad day. You're on trial for ADW and beating up your girlfriend. On day 3 of trial your attorney resigns from the state bar, to avoid being disbarred. You get convicted with a strike prior and get 8 years in prison. Not a good
day.

Hey, wait, what about that attorney thing? Well, in Johnson (1CAL.4th 689), the Cal. Supremes said that a lawyer who has resigned from the state bar isn't actually a lawyer, so a trial with this lawyer is a trial without a lawyer and requires reversal per se.

The California Attorney General here argues that the defendant did have counsel for 3 out of the 4 days of trial, so the Court of Appeal should only reverse if it finds prejudice. The Court of Appeal rejects this, reversing the conviction. See, not so bad.

But what was the Attorney General thinking? Huh?

People v. Vigil; 2008 DJ DAR 18222; DJ, 12/12/08; C/A 6th

December 23, 2008

POSSESSING MANY ITEMS OF CHILD PORN; HOW MANY COUNTS?

The defendent here possessed 46 items of child porn in 38 "containers" (disks, tapes, hard drives, etc.). So of course the DA filed 46 counts of PC 311.11, possession of child porn.

The Court of Appeal says that this is only one count, not 46. The fact that there were different containers doesn't matter.

People v. Manfredi; 2008 DJ DAR 18662; DJ, 12/23/08; C/A 5th

December 19, 2008

WHAT'S THE

NOTICE OF MOTION REQUIREMENT FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PITCHESS MOTIONS?

Pitchess (11 Cal.3d 531) discovery motions must comply with the notice of motion provisions in California Evidence Code sec. 1043 and California Code of Civil Procedure sec. 1005. You have to give 16 court days' notice of your motion, and you have to add 5 calendar days if you
serve by mail.

OK, your motion is granted. You investigate and now need to file a supplemental Pitchess motion to get the actual complaints. What time limit applies? This Court of Appeal says the same 16 and 5 day requirements apply to supplemental discovery motions.

COMMENTARY: So, this now begs the question....Why should be have to go back, spend more time and money, just to get basic complaint reports because the courts refuse to provide that relevant information in the first place? I find it ridiculous that courts refuse to provide us that actual complaints unless and until we can't get what we need from the initial discovery (which is usually only the names and telephone numbers of the complaining witnesses). Of course, there is no statute authorizing just this limited discovery in the first place. But our fraidy-cat judges are so scared that the cops won't back them in their next re-election, they are willing to violate the Constitute rather than go against the police legal advisors. Now do you know why I just sue cops?

Tulare v. Superior Court; 2008 DJ DAR 18492; DJ, 12/19/08; C/A 5th

Continue reading "WHAT'S THE " »

December 13, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: STOPPING CARS TO CHECK ON TEMPORARY PERMITS

STOPPING CARS TO CHECK ON TEMPORARY PERMITS

We were worried that the Supremes would wipe out Butler (202 Cal.App.3d
602). Butler says an officer can't stop a car to determine whether tinted windows in the car are illegally tinted. The officer can't detain to find out if there's a violation of law; the officer has to have reasonable cause to believe there's a violation. However, Butler lives to fight another day!

Both these cases involve stops for cars with temporary permits. In Raymond C., the officer sees a car with no license plates and no temporary permit in the rear window. The Supremes uphold a stop, even though it turned out that there was a permit in the front
window. The Supremes say that the stop was reasonable because driving past the car to see if there was a permit in the front window might have been dangerous. However, in Hernandez, the officer saw a car with no license plates which DID have a temporary permit in the rear window.

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The officer stopped the car because a lot of stolen cars have forged temporary permits. The Supremes rule that this search was illegal, because the officer had nothing specific to support his belief. So I think Raymond C. is narrow, and Butler survives.

In re Raymond C.; 2008 DJ DAR 18112; DJ, 12/13/08; Cal. Supremes (we
lose)

People v. Hernandez; 2008 DJ DAR 18109; DJ, 12/13/08; Cal. Supremes
(we win)

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: STOPPING CARS TO CHECK ON TEMPORARY PERMITS" »

November 27, 2008

ARANDA/BRUTON, CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT, AND CRAWFORD

ARANDA/BRUTON, CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT, AND CRAWFORD

There are a bunch of issues in this case. First, Aranda (63 Cal.2d 518) and Bruton (391 U.S. 123) bar use of an out-of-court statement made by a non-testifying co-defendant against another defendant (absent effective redaction).

Some of the statements here were redacted. But one wasn't: the co-defendant's statement that he and the defendant went looking for the guy their friend had a fight with. Of course, they
killed that guy. The Court of Appeal, incredibly, says that admission of this statement didn't violate Aranda/Bruton because the Court of Appeal finds this statement isn't "powerfully incriminating because it facially" incriminated the defendant; it wasn't "direct" evidence that the perpetrators intended to assault or kill the victim. Right; and it was admitted for what purpose?

Second issue: the defendant's standoff with SWAT. The Court of Appeal says that resistance to arrest, like flight, is admissible to show consciousness of guilt. But wait, the defendant had
two other uncharged shooting incidents for which he might have been resisting arrest. Too bad, they can't reward a pro over a neophyte with only one offense. Of course, this makes consciousness of guilt nonsense; what if he was guilty of two offenses but not guilty of this
one?

Third issue: Crawford (541 U.S. 36) bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless we get to confront the declarant. But what if the hearsay isn't testimonial? Well, Smith (135 Cal.App/4th 914) says that the constitutional restriction on nontestimonial hearsay is the old Ohio v. Roberts (448 U.S. 56) rule which was overruled by Crawford with respect to testimonial hearsay: is the statement sufficiently reliable?

The Court of Appeal claims that the recent Davis (547 U.S. 813) case from the US Supremes wipes Smith out. WRONG. Where the hearsay really is nontestimonial, due process should require that the hearsay meet a reliability requirement.

People v. Garcia; 2008 DJ DAR 16901; DJ, 11/17/08; C/A 4th

Continue reading "ARANDA/BRUTON, CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT, AND CRAWFORD" »

November 25, 2008

UNLAWFUL STOP, DISCOVERY OF A WARRANT, THEN A SEARCH. ILLEGAL? NAW!

UNLAWFUL STOP, DISCOVERY OF A WARRANT, THEN A SEARCH. ILLEGAL?

Hold your horses. It's gonna be a tough ride. Here we go and buckle of for this piece of dribble.

FACTS: The police unlawfully stop the defendant. So this is an unlawful traffic stop. It is. There is no question. It's wrong and it's illegal. Get it?

During the stop, before any search, the police find that the defendant has a warrant. They arrest the defendant, search, and find drugs. Result? You're probably going to say that the unlawful stop invalidates the search. You would be wrong.

The Cal. Supremes say that the discovery of the warrant is an intervening circumstance that attenuates the taint of the antecedent unlawful traffic stop. Say that three times fast. Um, is this tort law or something. This seems incredible to me. They note that evidence of purposeful or flagrant police misconduct would require suppression, as would a stop undertaken as a fishing expedition.

They distinguish Sanders (31 Cal.4th 318), which held that an unlawful search can't be justified by later discovery that the defendant is on probation or parole with search conditions, saying that no search occurred here until after the police found the warrant.

People v. Brendlin; 2008 DJ DAR 17352; DJ, 11/25/08; Cal. Supremes

Continue reading "UNLAWFUL STOP, DISCOVERY OF A WARRANT, THEN A SEARCH. ILLEGAL? NAW!" »

November 22, 2008

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING VOIR DIRE

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING VOIR DIRE

During voir dire, the DA in this case told the prospective jurors some stories about other rape trials that the DA handled, and things the jurors in those cases told him, as a way to tell this panel that they should just convict and shouldn't be bothered with trivial or collateral matters (like evidence).

The Court of Appeal says that this is prosecutorial misconduct, though they find it harmless error.

My next thought on prosecutorial misconduct is that we should ask the Court of Appeal when they make such a finding to file a complaint with the State Bbar. Prosecutors do this stuff quite frequently, knowing that the courts of appeal will find almost every reprehensible thing they do "harmless." But it's really not. The more they get away with it, the more they do it. And, while even if something is "harmless" to the trial, it certainly is a violation of the Rules of Professional Responsibility.

People v. Castillo; 2008 DJ DAR 17086; DJ, 11/20/08; C/A 4th

November 22, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: DISCRETIONARY FINDING RESULTING IN SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION MUST BE

DISCRETIONARY FINDING RESULTING IN SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION MUST BE
MADE BY A JURY

We actually FINALLY win an Apprendi (530 U.S. 466) issue. The jury acquitted this defendant of the only sexual offense charged against him. But the court made a finding that on the offenses where the defendant was convicted, he committed them for purposes of sexual gratification, permitting the discretionary order of sex registration under PC 290.

Apprendi says that any fact that increases the "penalty" for a crime must be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Does a finding that offenses were committed for sexual gratification, resulting in the Jessica's Law residency restriction, increase the penalty for the crime?

This Court of Appeal says yes. They do an extensive analysis about why the Jessica's Law
residency requirement is punitive and conclude that the necessary finding can't just be made by the judge.

Great case, which I suspect the Supremes won't let stand.

People v. Mosley; 2008 DJ DAR 17178; DJ, 11/21/08; C/A 4th

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: DISCRETIONARY FINDING RESULTING IN SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION MUST BE " »

November 21, 2008

NO CRIME? NO PROBLEM? GET CONVICTED ANYWAY

This is a very weird case. There was no crime, but the guy still got convicted. Say what? Okay, here we go...

The defendant is walking down the middle of the street, minding his own business. The police try to detain him for violation of a Sacramento city ordinance requiring that pedestrians walk
on sidewalks. The defendant runs away. The defendant is charged with resisting an executive officer in the performance of his duties. They don't actually say anywhere what code section this is; I presume it is PC 69.

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The Court of Appeal finds that the Sacramento ordinance is preempted by state law, so the defendant wasn't violating any law. We win, right? Of course not.

They say that the defendant's decision to flee dissipated the taint from the illegality, so suppression of the police observations is not appropriate.

Tjis is wrong. Penal COde sec.69 requires that a defendant resist an officer in the performance of his duties. How is the defendant's conduct a violation of PC 69? The legality of the officer's conduct is an element of the crime. (Manual G.,
16 C4th 805.)

Here, the def. pled (?), so I suppose that's why this Court of Appeal doesn't actually note that there's no crime here.

People v. Cox; 2008 DJ DAR 17321; DJ, 11/21/08; C/A 3rd

Continue reading "NO CRIME? NO PROBLEM? GET CONVICTED ANYWAY " »

November 20, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: YOU CAN'T USE ONE PRIOR TWICE IN SENTENCING

The court used the same prior conviction to impose upper term and to impose an extra year under PC 667.5(b). What about the rule barring the use of a single fact twice? The DA's theory is that the upper term is based on the fact of the conviction, while the 667.5(b) year is based on
the fact that the def. served time in prison.

The Court of Appeal cites the cases which have already settled this issue. (e.g., Jones, 5 Cal.4th 1142), and concludes that the court can't do this.

People v. McFearson; 2008 DJ DAR 17096; DJ, 11/20/08; C/A 5th

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: YOU CAN'T USE ONE PRIOR TWICE IN SENTENCING" »

October 20, 2008

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING AND APPRENDI

The U.S. Supreme Court this week heard argument on a case presenting the question of whether Apprendi (530 U.S. 466) applies to consecutive sentences.

In Cunningham (549 U.S. 270), the U.S. Supremes held that
Apprendi applies to California's upper term scheme. So can a judge impose a consecutive sentence based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant?

It looks like, from a review of all the pundits on the subject, that we will win this one. However, the California Supremes will also claim that somehow this doesn't apply in California, so we
won't get the benefit of this, until we get back to DC. Incidentally, check out (and subscribe to) the SCOTUS blog, a fabulous resource for U.S. Supreme Court stuff like this.

Oregon v. Ice; http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/

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September 4, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE:JURY SELECTION - BATSON - PROSECUTOR'S SPECULATIVE REASONS

JURY SELECTION: PROSECUTOR'S SPECULATIVE REASONS

Paulino v. Harrison (9th Cir. 9/4/08, 07-55429) 08 C.D.O.S. 11772

On remand from Ninth Circuit to district court to conduct evidentiary hearing to allow prosecutor to explain her actual motivations for the peremptory challenges, prosecutor testified she had no memory of the jury selection or her reasons for striking the jurors, could not find her notes, and reading the transcript of the jury selection did not refresh her recollection.

"Therefore, instead of explaining her actual non-discriminatory reasons for exercising her peremptory challenges, the prosecutor offered hypothetical race-neutral reasons for striking each potential African-American juror in question. She acknowledged that the reasons she articulated were mere speculation drawn from her reading of the voir dire transcript. Indeed, she testified that all the parties present — herself, the State’s attorney, Paulino’s attorney, the magistrate judge — were 'on the same page;' all each could do was comment on the transcript." The magistrate judge before whom the hearing was held recommended the petition be granted, and the district court adopted the recommendations.

In affirming the district court's ruling, Judge Richard Paez, speaking for the panel, says: "The State attempts to turn the prosecutor’s testimony about the transcript into circumstantial evidence by recasting her conjectured reasons as 'reconstructed' reasons. The State lifts the term 'reconstructed' from cases, like this one, that involved “reconstruction” hearings — that is, an evidentiary hearing that takes place some time after the trial, where the prosecutor testifies to her actual reasons for striking the venire-members in question, or the State presents circumstantial evidence of those reasons — and misapplies it to the prosecutor’s testimony here. [Fn. om.] Her reasons were not 'reconstructed,' as that term is used in Batson cases; they were constructed out of whole cloth. As the district court found, the prosecutor did nothing more than guess why she might have removed the jurors in question."

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September 4, 2008

NO MANDATORY SEX REGISTRATION FOR CONSENSUAL ORAL SEX WITH A 14-YEAR OLD

In Hofsheier (37 Cal.4th 1185), the California Supreme Court held that mandatory sex offender registration under PC 290 for consensual oral copulation with a minor 16 or 17 violated equal protection, because consensual sexual intercourse with such a minor didn’t trigger mandatory registration.

This Court of Appeal applies Hofsheier to hold that mandatory registration for Penal Code 288a(b)(2), consensual oral copulation with a 14-year old, also violates equal protection.

People v. Hernandez; 2008 DJ DAR 13935; DJ, 9/4/08; C/A 2nd, Div. 2

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September 3, 2008

CALIFORNIA DUE PROCESS TRAVESTY

HARMLESS CUNNINGHAM ERROR

The court imposed upper term based on the victims being particularly vulnerable, but the defendant didn’t admit that nor did the jury find that fact. And so the sentencing must be reversed as a violation of Cunningham (549 U.S. 270), right?

Nope. They find harmless error: a jury would have found that the victims were particularly vulnerable. Hey, just deny the defendant a jury trial on everything and then affirm by finding that any jury would have convicted anyway.

Why do we bother with these troublesome juries?

People v. Esquibel; 2008 DJ DAR 13876; DJ, 9/3/08; C/A 2nd, Div. 8

August 29, 2008

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER NEWS: USING RAP SHEETS TO PROVE PRIORS

USING RAP SHEETS TO PROVE PRIORS?

The DA used CLETS rap sheets to prove up the defendant's convictions. Does admission of rap sheets violate Crawford (541 U.S. 36), which bars use of testimonial hearsay unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross examine?

This Court of Appeal says no. They assure us that rap sheets aren’t testimonial, because they aren’t created to use as testimony, they’re just compilations of statistical data.

Of course, pure statistics wouldn’t establish the details of the prior convictions, needed to prove
that the priors qualify.

The Court of Appeal then says that the DA would end up having multiple witnesses to prove up the many levels of hearsay which appear in rap sheets, and might not even be able to figure out what witness should be called.

The Court of Appeal seems to think that this logic supports their point; if you think about it, it clearly wholly undermines their point. It is precisely the unreliable, many levels of hearsay that makes use of rap sheets a violation of the confrontation clause.

People v. Morris; 2008 DJ DAR 13699; DJ, 8/29/08; C/A 4th

August 15, 2008

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE NEWS: JUDGES CAN'T ORDER PSYCHIATRIC EXAMS ON CLIENTS

GOOD POST-VERDIN CASE; NO SHRINKING OUR CLIENTS DURING TRIAL

Here is a clear discovery win for the defense, although it is another affirmance of another deathpenalty case.

In Verdin (43 Cal.4th 1096), the California Supreme Court held that the discovery
statutes are the exclusive authorization for discovery orders directed to the defense, barring courts from making up ones not listed in Penal Code 1054.3.

In Verdin, the court said that prior to trial, judges can’t order your client to be “shrunk,” that is, examined by DA mental health experts, even though you put your client’s mental state in issue (with some exceptions).

But what about DURING trial? The Supremes say that Verdin controls! No court can order our client to submit to a mental health exam, even during trial. Nor can the DA then get a jury instruction or be allowed to argue that your refusal to submit to such an exam shows that your client is guilty.

On a second point, the recent Zamudio (43 C4th 327) case said that the DA could present evidence that an item had been provided to the defense laboratory. Here the prosecution asked the defense expert whether some of the defendant's blood sample had been released for independent analysis. The Supremes make the assumption that the DA's question to its expert about a defense test were erroneous, but find it harmless. Hey, at least they didn't say it was correct.

People v. Wallace; 2008 DJ DAR 12675; DJ, 8/15/08; Cal. Supremes

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August 8, 2008

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: SPEEDY TRIAL STAYED WHILE TRIAL LAWYER IS IN ANOTHER TRIAL

TRYING ONE CASE CONSENTS TO DELAY ON ALL OTHERS, AS ZERO OF TEN

This is a ridiculous case, but not entirely unexpected given the political posture of the day.

Here's the scenerios: You have 3 cases ready for trial. You announce ready on all 3. The California Supreme Court clearly restates that you should announce ready on every case you're ready on - the claim that you can only announce ready on one case is just wrong.

But what happens next? When the judge selects one for trial, or they make you select one, what are the time limits on all the remaining cases?

The California Supreme Court here says you've consented to delay on all those, even if (as here) the first case pled out without commencing trial. And the new date for each of the remaining cases isn't 10 of 10, it's 0 of ten.

They say that the Owens rule (28 Cal.3d 238), that defense delays within the initial 30-45-60 period don't extend the last day, doesn't apply to the 10-day trailing period.

One good thing: your failure to object to prosecution delays during the trailing period doesn't restart the time limits. And this implied consent is inapplicable if the defendant personally objects to the delays.

Then we get into a Johnson (26 C3d 557) situation, where the court tries to find other counsel to try the case within the applicable time period and, if it can't and the delay is caused by the lack of resources, the case gets dismissed. This case is a trainwreck.

Barsamyan v. Superior Court; 2008 DJ DAR 12277; DJ, 8/8/08; Cal. Supremes

August 6, 2008

CALIFORNIA FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL MAKES BIZARRE RULING ON USE OF PRIOR ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Here is a close runner up as "Outrage of the Week." The Courts seem to be getting more and more bold in violating the rules of evidence and defendants' Constitutional rights.

The DA got to present prior domestic violence evidence under California Evidence Code sec. 1109 on count one. The Court of Appeal struggles to justify this, because the count doesn't really charge a domestic violence offense. So they say is sort of does. Huh?

That's bad enough. But then they say that the prior domestic violence evidence comes in on count two, which is clearly not a domestic violence charge, because 1109 uses the word "action," meaning, get this, that if 1109 evidence comes in on one count, it comes in on EVERY OTHER COUNT in the "action" to prove guilt. So if the DA can smuggle a sex offense (Evidence Code sec. 1108) or a domestic violence offense into the information, they get to
use prior sex offenses or domestic violence offenses to prove guilt on, say the murder or robbery.

Objection! Relevance? Overruled on the grounds that we must make the prosecutor win!

People v. Dallas; 2008 DJ DAR 12225; DJ, 8/6/08; C/A 4th

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August 4, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE OUTRAGE OF THE WEEK: ACQUITTAL VACATED BY DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO VOLUNTEER THE WHEREABOUTS OF COMPLAINING WITNESS!

This case absolutely defies logic and supports the weirdo proposition that defense attorneys have to assist prosecutors when they lose their witnesses. You've got to be kidding!

Okay, so in this case, the DA got to the end of his case. But there was no victim to put on to support counts 3 and 4. The judge granted a dismissal on those counts pursuant to Penal Code sec. 118.1 granted.

The defendant informed his lawyer that he knew where the victim was and wanted her called on the remaining counts. Hide and seek! The court was outraged, and vacated its 1118.1 dismissal, resuscitating the dismissed counts.

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Ironically, the jury acquitted on counts 3 and 4. So, then, why the outrage?

But the California Court of Appeal is outraged at this malfeasance by the defendant. He's estopped from claiming double jeopardy because of forfeiture by wrongdoing.

This is an extreme case: the court claimed the defendant intentionally interfered with the trial process with his incredibly transparent ploy. If you're scratching your head, join the group. What, exactly, did the defendant do wrong? When the DA announced that he couldn't find the victim, was the defendant supposed to jump up and announce that he knew where she was?

Has the C/A heard of the 5th Amendment?

So, when the prosecutors lose their witnesses next time, make sure you get up and give them directions. This is just another example of judges trying to help inept prosecutors.

People v. Pearson; 2008 DJ DAR 12035; DJ, 8/4/08; C/A 2nd, Div. 6

August 2, 2008

TRIAL COURTS SHOULD NOT LIMIT VOIR DIRE

The California Supreme Court held last week that appellate courts have to do a comparative juror analysis on Batson (476 U.S. 79)/ Wheeler (22 Cal.3d 258) challenges.

What that means is that courts must compare jurors who have been kicked off with jurors who have been left on by the DA.

More importantly, this case contains a statement encouraging trial judges not to limit your voir dire. In fn. 16, the Supremes note the trial judge's power to limit the time for your voir dire, but go on to say, "Nevertheless, in exercising that discretion, trial courts should seek to balance the need for effective trial management with the duty to create an adequate record and allow legitimate inquiry."

Since most courts - mostly former prosecutors - limit our voir dire to the point where we can barely start developing our "for cause" challenges, we must use this this case to resist time limitations on our voir dire.

People v. Lenix; 2008 DJ DAR 11396; DJ, 7/25/08; Cal. Supremes

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August 1, 2008

KICKING OFF ALL SPANISH SPEAKING JURORS IS BIAS, COURT RULES

Finally, here is a Batson (476 U.S. 79)/ Wheeler (22 Cal.3d 258) win! The DA kicked off all the Hispanic jurors who spoke Spanish, on the basis that he was concerned about whether they would accept the interpreter's version and not interpret themselves.

The Court of Appeal holds that this IS group bias and is racist. Reversed!

People v. Gonzales; 2008 DJ DAR 11966; DJ, 8/1/08; C/A 3rd

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August 1, 2008

CALIFORNIA SEARCH AND SEIZURE; COURT SAYS ACCESSING CELL PHONE HOURS AFTER THE ARREST IS JUST FINE

The defendant was arrested. He is transported to the police station. An hour after the arrest, the police seize the defendant's cell phone. Thirty minutes later, during interrogation of the defendant, the police access the phone's text message folder and retrieve an incriminating message.

The Court of Appeal has no trouble with this as a "search incident to arrest". You can see that the search wasn't contemporaneous with the arrest, but the Court of Appeal assures us that this doesn't matter. Searches incident to arrest are just fine, to protect the officer and to search for evidence of the crime.

People v. Diaz; 2008 DJ DAR 11973; DJ, 8/1/08; C/A 2nd, Div. 6

July 29, 2008

DEATH PENALTY REVERSED WHEN JUROR WAS WRONGFULLY KICKED OFF JURY

In this California death penalty case, the California Supreme Court affirm the guilty verdict in this death appeal, but did reverse the penalty verdict.

The trial judge kicked off the holdout juror, the only African-American on the jury. Under Cleveland (25 Cal.4th 466), a juror can be excused only on a showing of a demonstrable reality that the juror was refusing to deliberate or prejudged the case or
wouldn't follow the instructions.

The claims relied on by the judge here fell far short of the required showing. They also reaffirm the rule (see, Tealer, 48 Cal.App.3d 598) that a defendant can testify to only one aspect of a case and can't then be cross-examined on another. In this case, the defendant wanted to testify about the Evidence Code 1108 prior rape claim but not be crossed on the pending murder.

People v. Wilson; 2008 DJ DAR 11507; DJ, 7/29/08; Cal. Supremes

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July 25, 2008

DISMISSALS FOR VIOLATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL BEFORE THE END OF THE LAST DAY

DISMISSALS FOR VIOLATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL BEFORE THE END OF THE LAST DAY

On the last day for trial in these misdemeanor cases, there just wasn't any court to send them to, so the judge dismissed them. The DA appealed. The Appellate Division affirms the dismissal, rejecting a slew of DA nonsense.

They say that the lack of courtrooms isn't good cause. Of note is their affirming a dismissal before the end of the court day, an issue we've always lost before.

People v. Cole; http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions; (7/25/08; Riverside App. Div.)

July 2, 2008

THE PROSECUTION CAN PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT A DEFENSE LAB EXAMINED EVIDENCE

THE PROSECUTION HAS THE RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT A DEFENSE LAB
EXAMINED EVIDENCE-RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES TO DEFEAT THIS HORROR

This case was reported in this blog a few months ago. Here, the DA was permitted to repeatedly present evidence from the police criminalists that crucial evidence was released to a defense lab.

The California Supreme Court rejected a defense work product argument. They then rejected the 6th Amendment challenge by saying that their work product ruling disposed of all those
challenges.

A great many criminal prominent criminal defense lawyers petitioned the court to delete or modify this discussion.

The Supremes modified their opinion with a phrase. It looks like what they are saying is that
since no constitutional issues were raised, the only constitutional issues presented are those at issue inherent in the work product issue, and so rejection of the work product
issue is also a rejection of any constitutional issue presented by the
work product issue.

If that sounds like gibberish, you got it. If this actually comes up, raise challenges based on the 5th and 6th Amendments, the attorney-client privilege, work product, and relevancy, as well as EC 352.

People v. Zamudio; 2008 DJ DAR 8604; DJ, 6/13/08; Cal. Supremes

June 12, 2008

SAN DIEGO CITY ATTORNEY MIKE AGUIRRE, AND DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY DAVID STOTLAND REVERSED - AGAIN - IN POLICE MISCONDUCT CASE

PITCHESS DISCOVERY WIN

The trial court denied this Pitchess (11 C3d 531) motion in a misdemeanor case. The City Attorney argues that the facts are essentially agreed upon, and that the defense justification for
discovery is really just about differences in perceptions.

The Fourth District, Division One, Court of Appeal disagrees, saying the allegations in the defense affidavit that the police beat up the defendant and that the defendant never did a lot of the stuff the police claimed weren't just a difference in perception.

Matt Braner, San Diego PD, was successful appellate counsel. City Attorney Mike Aguirre and his incompetent hatchetman, David Stotland, lost - again. Perhaps they should think about protecting the public from the bad cops?

Uybungco v. Superior Court; 2008 DJ DAR 8444; DJ, 6/11/08; C/A 4th

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