August 6, 2010

WHAT DOES PRESUMED PREJUDICE MEAN? (Criminal Defense Lawyer Mary Prevost)

A lengthy pre-filing delay, say a year or so, triggers presumed prejudice under Serna (40 Cal.3d 239). But what does that mean? In Alvarado (60 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1), the LA Appellate Division said a long delay triggers a hearing, but doesn't
mean prejudice is presumed; you have to show actual prejudice to have that factor weigh in your favor.

The Kern Appellate Division disagrees. They hold that a long delay means that prejudice IS
presumed, and weighs in your favor when weighing whether due process has been violated. So now we have dueling appellate divisions.

Bellante v. Superior Court; no DJ cite; 2010 WL 2978066; 2010 Cal.
App. LEXIS 1264; Kern County App. Div.

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July 9, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: WHEN IS IT A MASSIAH VIOLATION?

MASSIAH VIOLATIONS

The police put a guy into the defendant's cell, figuring that they might get an admission from the defendant. The guy (who was implicated in the crime) did in fact get the defendant to make several incriminating statements. Does this violate Massiah (377 US 201), which bars the DA from sending undercover informants into jail to elicit confessions? No.

The informant did deliberately elicit incriminating statements, one requirement of Massiah. But the second requirement was not met: the informant has to
be acting as a government agent. This means he had to have acted under the direction of the government. The Supremes assure us that there was no evidence that there was any preexisting arrangement between the informant and the police. This is the kind of case where 10 years from now we're shocked to hear that the police did send this guy in so he
could get a break on his own case.

People v. Hartsch; 2010 DJ DAR 9870; DJ, 6/29/10; Cal. Supremes

July 5, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: REPEATEDLY INVOKING MIRANDA ISN'T INVOKING MIRANDA

REPEATEDLY INVOKING MIRANDA FAILS TO INVOKE MIRANDA

This case is an utter outrage. What does it take to invoke Miranda? The defendant here was
asked, "Do you want an attorney here while you talk to us?" He said, "Yeah." You do? "Uh huh." You sure? "Yes." This gets "clarified" and the Supremes hold that this didn't invoke Miranda.

The defendant later said, "I want to see my attorney cause you're all bullshitting now." The Supremes: not unambiguous. The defendant was just expressing frustation. Next, the defendant said, "I don't want to talk about it." You guessed it, this is just an expression of frustration. Well, I'm pretty frustrated myself. They're going to EXECUTE this guy?! Give me a break.

I WANT MY FUCKING LAWYER. WHAT IS IT YOU DON'T GET?

People v. Williams; 2010 DJ DAR 10023; DJ, 6/30/10; Cal. Supremes

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July 1, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: ATTORNEYS-YOU MUST HAVE INVESTIGATORS

NEED ABSOLUTE NEED FOR INVESTIGATORS

Terrific case, even though the lawyer here was found ineffective. Lake County has 12 contract Public Defenders. hey have only one investigator for the entire office. So the investigator was way too busy to work on this trivial transportation of meth case, on which the defendant got over 10 years.

The defense made a California Penal Code sec. 1538.5 motion, claiming that the layout of the intersection at issue made it impossible for the officer to see what he claimed to have seen, that the defendant didn't stop at the stop sign. It turns out that it's an unusual intersection, and if the ofrficer was where he said he was, he couldn't have seen the area of the stop sign.

The California Court of Appeal finds ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) here, for the failure to use an investigator. There's an excellent discussion about the need for trained, professional investigators. The defense had some photographs taken by the defendant, and even some civilian witnesses, but these were no substitute for a real investigator. I think that we can use this to fully staff investigator units in PD offices, and to get more investigators in offices or contract groups without enough investigators. I even think we can use this to get all sorts of
experts.
Jones v. Superior Court; 2010 DJ DAR 10216; DJ, 7/1/10; C/A 1st, Div. 2

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April 7, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: DUE DILIGENCE FOR OUT-OF-STATE WITNESSES

The victim here testified at the prelim. But she was out of state when trial was scheduled. The DA used the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses to get the victim to California, but didni' have the victim arrested when she was uncooperative.

The Cal. Supremes rule that the DA doesn't have to have the victim arrested to establish the
required due diligence. The court goes on and on about how this poor victim would have been arrested. Right, ALL bench warrants for witnesses who fail to appear result in arrest.

People v. Cogswell; 2010 DJ DAR 4897; DJ, 4/2/10; Cal. Supremes

April 7, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: REASONABLE CAUSE FOR SCHOOL SEARCHES

In T.L.O. (469 US 325), the US Supremes said that school officials could conduct a search if it was reasonable, even if there was no probable cause. Here, the police called the school to tell them that this minor had illegal pills on him. The vice principal searched the minor with the police present. The Court of Appeal that T.L.O. controls here, although you
might think that the school was merely acting as the agent of the police.

In re K.S.; 2010 DJ DAR 4459; DJ, 3/26/10; C/A 1st, Div. 5

April 5, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: DUTY TO ADVISE CLIENTS OF IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES

The US Supremes here rule that the failure to advise a criminal defendant in state court of the federal immigration consequences of his plea is ineffective assistance of counsel. They remand for a hearing on prejudice. They make it clear that a generic advisement that the plea will have some unspecified consequences isnit enough.

Your duty is to advise the defendnate specific consequences of the plea. This duty only involves consequences that are clear, succinct and straightforward. As Alito points out, this just means a whole jurisprudence on what is clear and what is in doubt. We thought that this case was only going to say that you have a duty not to misadvise the client, but nope, you've got to give accurate advice on the consequences. It is not clear how this affects Kim (45 Cal.4th 1078) and Villa (45 Cal.4th 1063), the cases from the Cal. Supremes limiting challenges to immigration misadvisements; those cases require custody, real or constructive, and reject IAC as a ground for such a challenge.

Whatever this means, it surely means that weive all got to understand immigration consequences, and explain them to our clients. At least the consequences that are clear.

Padilla v. Kentucky; 2010 DJ DAR 4858; DJ, 4/1/10; US Supremes

March 1, 2010

SANTA CLARA PROSECUTOR'S FOUR-YEAR SUSPENSION FOR MISCONDUCT UPHELD

FOUR YEAR SUSPENSION FOR PROSECUTOR UPHELD.

A former Santa Clara County deputy district attorney abused his office and violated the due process rights of several criminal defendants, a State Bar Court review panel ruled last month, and should therefore lose his law license for four years.

Finding that BENJAMIN THOMAS FIELD [#168197] “disregarded prosecutorial accountability in favor of winning cases,” the three-judge panel upheld the recommendation of hearing Judge Pat McElroy and also urged that Field be given five years of probation.

The state Supreme Court must rule on the recommendation before it takes effect.

Field, 45, a career prosecutor and one-time rising star in the DA’s office, originally was charged with 25 counts of misconduct in four cases he prosecuted. The bar court dismissed several charges as duplicative.

“Although our system of administering justice is adversarial in nature and prosecutors must be zealous advocates in prosecuting their cases, it cannot be at the cost of justice,” wrote Judge Catherine Purcell, who was joined in the decision by Judges JoAnn Remke and Judith Epstein.

“Field lost sight of this goal,” Purcell continued, “ … and in doing so, he disregarded the foundation from which any prosecutor’s authority flows — ‘The first, best and most effective shield against injustice for an individual accused … must be found … in the integrity of the prosecutor.’”

The judges found that Field’s misconduct began shortly after his 1993 admission to the bar and spanned 10 years. The allegations stemmed from four cases and charged:

Field obtained a dental examination of a minor accused of sexual assault in violation of a court order. He was attempting to try the youth, who claimed to be 13, as an adult. A juvenile court judge suppressed the evidence obtained in the examination.
In a murder case, Field intentionally withheld a defendant’s statement favorable to co-defendants. As a result, the judge dismissed a 25-year gun enhancement against one of the co-defendants.
He made an improper closing argument in a sexually violent predator (SVP) case, which an appellate court described as “deceptive and reprehensible.” The court reversed a judgment committing the man as an SVP.
He intentionally withheld a witness’ statement that was favorable to the defense in a 2003 habeas corpus proceeding involving a sexual assault. The judge found that he committed a discovery violation.
In that matter, the review panel found that Field’s misconduct escalated over time and constituted “a calculated scheme to hide evidence favorable to the defense.”

Two men who were convicted of sexual assault had filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus and provided a declaration by a witness who claimed the 15-year-old victim had made false accusations because she missed curfew.

Field’s investigator found and interviewed the witness but did not notify the defense. In addition, he instructed his investigator to prepare a misleading declaration and filed it with the court, filed a statement with the court implying he did not know the witness’ whereabouts, and then waited five months before disclosing the interview, only after opposing counsel learned of the interview and had filed a motion alleging prosecutorial misconduct.

Finally, the court concluded, Field urged the court to proceed with the habeas hearing without the witness.

In the same case, Field obtained five search warrants despite the judge’s doubts about his tactics. Indeed, when Field asked the judge what to do if he needed a warrant in an emergency, the judge testified, “I looked him right in the eye and I said, ‘Ben, just don’t do it.’” Five days later, Field obtained a search warrant in another state without notifying the habeas judge.

The review panel found the Field committed several acts of moral turpitude, and did not obey a court order or follow the law. Field admitted to poor judgment and viewing his discovery obligations too narrowly, and self-reported the finding of prosecutorial misconduct to the bar.

Throughout the trial before Judge McElroy, which drew widespread interest among Field’s colleagues, he defended his behavior. The review department rejected his assertions.

Although the misconduct could have resulted in disbarment, the court found extensive mitigation, including Field’s cooperation with the bar’s investigation, an impressive record of pro bono service and “an extraordinary demonstration of good character.” In particular, it expressly noted the testimony of former Santa Clara District Attorney George Kennedy, who lauded Field’s “extraordinary professional skills and good character” and said he considers Field an honest person who is not intentionally corrupt.

Field left the DA’s office and is now chief of staff with Working Partnerships USA, a San Jose company that addresses the needs of working families in Silicon Valley.

The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) filed an amicus brief on his behalf warning that several of the grounds for discipline involved questions of law that have not been settled. “Attorneys should be disciplined for conduct that violates clearly established law, or conduct so outrageous that its illegality is obvious,” the amicus stated, “but should not be disciplined for conduct where the law is unsettled.”

Field’s attorney, Allen Ruby, did not return a phone call for comment, nor did W. Scott Thorpe, CDAA chief executive officer.

March 1, 2010

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: COURT OF APPEAL REVERSES CASE FOR JUROR MISCONDUCT

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL REVERSES CASE WHERE JUROR'S MISCONDUCT WAS PERVASIVE

The California Court of Appeal Fourth District, Division Four, has just reversed a case where a juror committed "pervasive" misconduct. In this case, the San Diego trial juror repeatedly violated his oath to remain impartial and to refrain from speaking to anyone juring the court of the trial. Because the juror consistently and pervasively spoke about the testimony in trial to a non-juror friend - including commenting on the defendant's failure to tetify - the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's d enial of his Motion for New Trial.

Click HERE to read the opinion.

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February 25, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: COURT OF APPEALS RULES FAVORABLY ON DEFENSE MELENDEZ-DIAZ/CRAWFORD CASE

A multitude of cases were granted review last year on the Melendez-Diaz/Crawford issue. It's a hot topic. Actually, it's pretty straight forward. But it's a hot topic because it stops the prosecution from trying to convict defendant's without their ability to confront the evidence against them. And try and try and try again they will. This one stoped them in their tracks.

This California Court of Appeal ruled against the defense last year prior to Melendez-Diaz. Melendez-Diaz came out and the California Supreme Court granted
review and transferred this case back to the Court of Appeal in light of Melendez-Diaz. Take that!

Melendez-Diaz barred use of affidavits to establish that an item was contraband, as violative of Crawford and confrontation. This Court of Appeal correctly notes that the fact that evidence qualifies under a firmly-rooted hearsay exception doesn't make it an exception to confrontation. The report here that the item was meth was prepared in contemplation of its use in litigation. The Court of Appeal also rejects the AG's argument that the report here was OK because it was made contemporaneous with the test.

Finally, relying on Geier (41 Cal.App.4th 555), the AG argues that confrontation was satisfied by having the chemist's supervisor testify. Nope, says the Court of Appeal, the defense didn't get to confront the guy who DID the test. Ridiculuous. Reversed.

People v. Benitez; 2010 DJ DAR 2788; DJ, 2/25/10; C/A 4th, Div. 3

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February 24, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: MIRANDA ON THE BLINK

RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING INTERROGATION

It's Miranda week at the U.S. Supremes, and they hand over two losses to the defense. The first one deals with the right of the defendant to have counsel DURING questioning. The Florida police here told the defendant that he had the right to counsel BEFORE questioning, and that he had the right to use any of his rights at any time.

The U.S. Supremes assure us that this made it clear to the defendant that he had the right to counsel during questioning.

Florida v. Powell; 2010 DJ DAR 2675; DJ, 2/24/10; U.S. Supreme Court

February 23, 2010

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: SAN DIEGO POLICE OFFICERS TO WEAR VIDEO CAMERAS

The San Diego Police Department and the San Jose Police Department are initiating a pilot program where officers will wear video cameras while on duty. Click HERE for story.

Interesting. The Oceanside PD tried that some years back, as did Laguna. Funny, when defense attorneys started pointing out to the DA's that the videotapes showed a dramatically difference picture than the police reports, cases started getting dismissed.

Oceanside and Laguna finally trashes the cameras. Let's see how long this will last. I suspect that in the first case I get where I ask for the video, I will be told it was on the blink....

February 12, 2010

SAN DIEGO POLICE MISCONDUCT: COURT OF APPEAL ORDERS "BRADY" DISCOVERY FROM POLICE PERSONNEL FILE IN LYING COP CASE

BRADY DUTY BUT NOT PITCHESS DUTY

The defendant was convicted of murder, and a key witness testified against him. The police detective told the defense that this guy wasn't a paid informant. Some years later, the defense stumbled across information which showed that the guy was in fact a paid informant. The defense now files a habeas petition.

The defense seeks Brady (373 U.S. 83) discovery of complaints in the detective's personnel file that the detective claimed that informants weren't paid when in fact they were.

bad%20cop.jpg

This is an interesting case because the C/A finds no basis for Pitchess (11 C3d
531) discovery but does order review of the detective's personnel file on Brady grounds, correctly finding that prior complaints about the detective lying about informants being paid would impeach the detective's testimony at any habeas hearing. This is the first possible published case where the court finds a discovery duty under Brady but not
Pitchess.

Eulloqui v. Superior Court; 2010 DJ DAR 1930; DJ, 2/7/10; C/A 2nd,
Div. 1

January 28, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: USING A NICKNAME FROM A HORROR MOVIE CAN GET YOU IN TROUBLE

In this recent case, the deputy district attorney was permitted to elicit the defendant's nickname, "Chucky," - the doll from the horror movie who comes to life and slashes people - and then to argue all about the horror movie.

chucky1.jpg

No problem, says this California Court of Appeal. The defendant intended the nickname to be used to scare people.

But they do reject a kill zone argument. The single shot here could have hit either of two people, but the third person couldn't have been shot given the angles. The DA gets two counts of attempted murder, not three.

People v. Geovanny Leon, aka Chucky; 2010 DJ DAR 1415; DJ, 1/28/10;
C/A 2nd, Div. 6

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January 27, 2010

MURDER DEFENSE - IMPERFECT SELF DEFENSE

Imperfect self defense (which only applies if there is actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self defense) reduces a murder to a manslaughter. (Flannel, 25 C3d 668.) But what, exactly has to be unreasonable? The CALCRIM on imperfect self defense for an actual
killing (571) says that imperfect self defense applies if EITHER the defendant unreasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, OR the defendant unreasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary. The CALCRIM on imperfect self defense for an attempted killing (604) says that imperfect self defense applies only if BOTH beliefs are unreasonable. The California Court of Appeal rules that if EITHER belief is unreasonable, imperfect self defense applies, to killing or attempted killing.

People v. Her; 2010 DJ DAR 1291; DJ, 1/27/10; C/A 3rd

January 26, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: U.S. SUPREME COURT REVERSES VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT ON MELENDEZ-TYPE CONFRONTATION CASE

BRISCOE V. VIRGINIA
Decided: 1/25/10
No. 07-11191
Full Text: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/07-11191.pdf

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
(Signed certificates prepared by forensic analysts
are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause)

The United States Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision vacating the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia and remanding the case for
further proceedings consistent with its recent opinion in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.

Briscoe was arrested for possession of cocaine. At trial, he objected to the admission of analysis certificates used to prove that the substance he possessed was cocaine. Briscoe claimed the right to confront the forensic analysts that produced the certificates. Procedural safeguards in Virginia allow defendants to call forensic analysts as witnesses. Briscoe argued
that the safeguard did not adequately satisfy his right to confront the witnesses against him as guaranteed in the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that it did not need to determine whether the certificates were testimonial under Crawford. Testimonial statements
subject to the Confrontation Clause will not be admissible in court unless the person who made the statement testifies in court and is subject to cross examination, or if the defense had a prior opportunity to cross examine the witness.

The Court vacated the Virginia Supreme Court decision and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with Melendez-Diaz, in which the Court held that affidavits such as forensic analysis certificates are testimonial statements under Crawford. The Confrontation Clause requires the opportunity for cross examination regarding these statements.

January 18, 2010

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: IS A SCHOOL A PUBLIC PLACE?

IS SCHOOL A PUBLIC PLACE?

California Penal Code sec. 594.1(e)(1) makes it a crime for anyone under 18 to possess an
aerosol paint container for the purpose of defacing property while in any public place. The minor here was at school. Is this a public place?

Of course not, try walking into any public school these days, you'd be stopped instantly and barred from admission. To make this defendant lose, this California Court of Appeal launches into a wacko discussion of what "public place" means, defining it, I kid you not, as "a place in which the public has an interest," and says that keeping schools free of graffiti is a matter of
public interest. Give me a break.

In re Miguel H.; 2010 DJ DAR 611; DJ, 1/14/10; C/A 2nd, Div. 7

January 18, 2010

CALIFORNIA SENTENCING LAW: ENHANCEMENTS AND MINIMUM PAROLE ELIGIBILITY

The defendant here was convicted of attempted premeditated murder. He got a 25 years-to-life enhancement under California Penal Code sec. 12022.53 for firing a gun causing great bodily injury. He also got a minimum parole eligibility of 15 years, under PC 186.22(b)(5). Relying on Brookfield (47 Cal.4th 583), the California Court of Appeal holds that the defendant can't get BOTH the GBI enhancement and the minimum parole eligibility term; he gets the former, not the latter. Oh well. C'est la Gare.

People v. Gonzalez; 2010 DJ DAR 551; DJ, 1/13/10; C/A 2nd, Div. 8

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January 18, 2010

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER: RESTITUTION FOR COSTS AT KAISER

At Kaiser Permanente, you pay a membership fee, then you pay only a token amount for medical services, less than the actual costs of those services. The defendant here injured the victim, who got treatment at Kaiser. The trial court rdered no restitution. The DA wants restitution for the full amount Kaiser claimed. The California Court of Appeal must order payment for the actual services provided, even though the victim didn' actually pay
for them. But it s not the full amount claimed. Kaiser had agreed to accept a lesser amount as payment in full; that's the amount to be ordered.

People v. Duong; 2010 DJ DAR 673; DJ, 1/15/10; C/A 1st, Div. 3

January 16, 2010

CALIFORNIA C RIMINAL LAW: PROVING OUT-OF-STATE PRIORS

PROVING OUT-OF-STATE PRIORS
The def.is sentence here was doubled because of an Alabama prior. For
that prior to qualify as a strike, the "face of the record" had to show
infliction of great bodily injury by the def. on someone other than an
accomplice. The C/A assures us that the document at issue here, a copy
of an original certified copy of the indictment, qualifies as face of
the record. Remember, even if a crime isnit on the PC 1192.7(c) serious
felony list, it can still be a strike prior if the "face of the record"
shows conduct thatis on the list.

People v. Skiles; 2010 DJ DAR 541; DJ, 1/13/10; C/A 4th, Div. 3