June 17, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: IMPROPERLY BARRING THE DEFENSE FROM IMPEACHING THE VICTIM WARRANTS REVERSAL

The defendant was convicted of molesting an 11-year old girl. The defense sought to impeach the victim with evidence that she had advanced knowledge of sexual activities, and told others how sexually attractive she was (she said that a neighborhood boy wanted to "hump her brains
out").

The California trial court excluded this evidence. The 9th circuit grants habeas relief, finding that this violated the defendant's 6th Amendment right of confrontation. The court points out that this evidence was clearly relevant to impeach the victim's credibility.

Holley v. Yarborough; 2009 DJ DAR 8638; DJ, 6/17/09; 9th Cir. Fed C/A

May 20, 2009

SAN DIEGO POLICE OFFICER DAMON SMITH WITHHOLDS EVIDENCE IN CASES

OCEANSIDE — Some convicts could get new trials because an Oceanside police officer withheld some taped interviews in cases dating to 2001, it was reported Tuesday.

Officer Damon Smith, who disclosed that he had some recordings in his locker that were not entered into evidence as part of a domestic violence case in April, apparently failed to turn over some interviews with suspects and witnesses ever since he was hired eight years ago, the North County Times reported.

"We are gathering information so that we may complete a legal analysis of the issues and take appropriate action," Paul Levikow of the District Attorney's Office told the Times.

In criminal proceedings, all evidence must be made available over to both sides.

"These are highly significant tapes to be left out of the criminal justice process – and eight years is mind-boggling," San Diego County Public Defender Steve Carroll said.

Prosecutors are reviewing the tapes and plan to turn them over to their defense attorneys, who could argue for new trials.

The defense attorney in the domestic violence case said that Smith may have kept the tapes as backup in the event that someone filed a complaint against him. The officer, who was a homicide detective for a while, was involved in the investigation of the shooting death of Oceanside police Officer Dan Bessant, but there was no evidence he failed to turn over recordings in that case.

Still, the tapes prompted a delay in sentencing gang member Meki Gaono in Bessant's 2006 slaying. The sentencing, which had been set for this week, was put off until June 4.

Smith was unavailable for comment on Monday. It was unclear what discipline he might face.

May 15, 2009

ANONYMOUS CALL, NO SOURCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE, NO PROBLEM

Well, the outrage of the week has three actual outrages in it. The police get an anonymous call of a disturbance outside a house, and maybe one guy has a gun. The police respond and see the defendant and another, and try to detain them. The defendant resists arrest.

First issue: the detention is unlawful under Florida v. J.L. (529 U.S. 266). The Court of Appeal relies on Dolly (40 Cal.4th 458) and finds the facts here just like those in Dolly, and affirms. Right, except for that little J.L. case, with facts right on point.

Second issue: Harvey-Madden. If we demand it, the DA has to bring in somebody to prove the call wasn't stiffed in by the police. Oh, no problem, the level of detail here means that the caller was either the officer himself or the dispatcher was clairvoyant. The point of the rule is to avoid the police calling these in themselves, and you're just assuming that the police didn't do that.

Third issue: even if there wasn't reasonable cause to detain, the defense can't get suppression. Why not? Well, the defendant committed a crime. The crime, of course, is resisting arrest. Lots of officers saw it. The defendant's decision to commit a new crime, you guessed it, dissipates the taint of any preceding illegality. Come on.

In re Richard G.; 2009 DJ DAR 6883; DJ, 5/14/09; C/A 2nd, Div. 6

May 8, 2009

SAN DIEGO DUI DEFEWNSE: DRUNK DRIVING CONVICTION REVERSED FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

When's the last time you saw a case holding that there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to convict the defendant of DUI? Maybe never? The defendant didn't stop his truck behind the limit line at an intersection, with perhaps half the truck over the line before the defendant stopped. The offficer (this is obviously a pretext stop, a point never discussed) stops the defendant. The defendant shows signs of methamphetamine intoxication: rigid muscles, dilated pupils, sweating, etc. But the point is that there's no evidence that any of this ACTUALLY AFFECTED the defendant's driving. Yes, it could have. But there has to actually be evidence that it did. The only bad driving was trivial. Case reversed on insufficiency of the evidence!

People v. Torres; 2009 DJ DAR 6490; DJ, 5/6/09; C/A 4th

April 29, 2009

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT:EVIDENCE OF SELF-INCRIMINATION ASSERTION

People v. Waldie (4th Dist., 4/24/09, E042303) 09 C.D.O.S. 4980

Error (harmless here under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24) for Riverside County Judge Albert J. Wojcik to allow prosecutor to introduce evidence of prearrest silence and then to argue it.

Police were allowed to testify that defendant never participated in police interview even after he was called a dozen times. Judge instructed jury that it showed consciousness of guilt. In closing argument, prosecutor commented that defendant had not cooperated with police investigation. Evidence and argument violated Fifth Amendment because defendant was deprived of meaningful right to refuse to talk to police.

"If the police are allowed to call a subject persistently and then offer his unwillingness to response as evidence of guilt, a defendant would never be able to claim the protection of the freedom of incrimination ... testimony about repeated phone calls and apparent evasiveness ... is constitutionally infirm." But see Jenkins v. California (1980) 447 U.S. 231 (prearrest silence may be used to impeach credibility).

How can this be "harmless error"? It deals with a Constitutional right!

April 21, 2009

SHOWING HARMFUL MATTER TO A MINOR (What's "Harmful?)

The defendant here was convicted of showing harmful matter to a minor in violation of California Penal Code sec. 288.2. The Court of Appeal says that "harmful matter" doesn't require that an
average adult would find the material patently offensive and unsuitable for minors.

The Court of Appeal says that the test is the 3-prong Miller (413 U.S.15) test, that the average person, applying community standards, would find that the work appeals to prurient interest, the work depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and the work as a whole lacks serious literary value.

The defendant here showed the minor two TV shows, one showing a naked woman dancing, the second a torso only shot of a man and a woman having sex. I think this sounds like standard cable TV fare, but of course the Court of Appeal finds sufficient evidence that this
qualifies as "harmful matter."

People v. Dyke; 2009 DJ DAR 5213; DJ, 4/10/09; C/A 1st

April 11, 2009

CAL SUPREMES ISSUE NUTTY RULING ON AIDING AND ABETTING

In one of their more wacko decisions, the California Supreme Court has held that an aider and abettor can be guilty of a more serious crime than the perpetrator. (McCoy, 25 Cal.4th 1111.) But the CALCRIM (400) says that an aider is "equally" as guilty as the perpetrator. The Court of Appeal admits that if the aider can be guilty of a greater crime than the perpetrator, the aider can also be guilty of a lesser crime than the perpetrator. Either way, there are scenarios where the aider is not equally as guilty as the perpetrator. So the Court of Appeal says that the CALCRIM is wrong.

People v. Samaniego; 2009 DJ DAR 5081; DJ, 4/8/09; C/A 2nd, Div. 2

April 11, 2009

PRIOR SEXUAL OFFENSE EVIDENCE IN MURDER DURING A RAPE

California Evidence Code section 1108 permits admission of prior sex offenses to prove the
propensity of the defendant to commit a currently charged sex offense. The California Supremes here rule that rape-murder and burglary-murder where the burglary is for the purpose of committing rape are sexual offenses, so 1108 evidence is admissible in such prosecutions.

People v. Story; 2009 DJ DAR 5205; DJ, 4/10/09; Cal. Supremes

April 5, 2009

OBTAINING JUVENILE COURT DELINQUENCY RECORDS

This might seem like a niche juvenile sealing case, but I suspect it has great potential impact. The juvenile court found R.S. a delinquent ward of the juvenile court for having performed a lewd act on a 7-year old victim, M.L. The parents of M.L. want to sue the parents of R.S. through
their insurance company. The insurance company wants to view the tape of an interview of M.L. by a Child Abuse Services Team (CAST); that interview was done to pursue the juvenile delinquency action.

The juvenile court granted disclosure with an order limiting dissemination of the tape. The C/A upholds this disclosure order. This is a rare opinion on WIC 827, the statute governing inspection and disclosure of juvenile delinquency records. So why should you care? Have you ever sought disclosure of juvenile court delinquency (or dependency, for that matter) records so you could use them to impeach a prosecution witness?

This is a great case discussing the court rules and the law governing this topic.

R.S. v. Superior Court; 2009 DJ DAR 4857; DJ, 4/2/09; C/A 4th

April 5, 2009

SUBSTANTIVE GANG CRIME REQUIRES CRIME TO BE FOR THE GANG

This case addresses the substantive gang crime, PC 186.22(a). This crime applies to any person who actively participates in a criminal street gang and who willfully assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang. So hereis the question: does the crime itself have to be gang related?

Seems obvious, no?

Actually, it is not obvious. The AG argues here that ANY felonious conduct qualifies, so long as the defendant is an active gang participant. The Court of Appeal rejects this claim. The
court holds that the crime requires proof of gang-related felonious criminal conduct.

People v. Ramirez; 2009 DJ DAR 4809; DJ, 4/1/09; C/A 4th

March 31, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: SECOND-DEGREE FELONY MURDER AND MERGER

We are not in a common law state, there are no common law crimes. Right? Well, not so fast. There is second-degree felony murder, a crime wholly made up by the Supremes. The Supremes here try to put this problem to rest by claiming that they really didnit make up this crime.

They claim that implied malice, based on the abandoned and malignant heart language in PC 188, really does make second-degree felony murder a crime. Right. Anyway, this analysis compels the court to limit second-degree felony murder to inherently dangerous felonies, inherently dangerous in the abstract, regardless of the actual facts of any specific crime. OK.

But then the court turns to the merger doctrine. Essentially, this is really a simple idea. Picture, if you will, a defendant shooting a victim. During the time that the bullet is in the air, the crime is attempted murder or at least ADW. If the bullet misses, you have at least an ADW. If it hits and kills the victim, you have murder.

Now is this a felony murder, the felony being the ADW? You can see that this approach would turn every murder into felony murder. In Ireland (70 Cal.2d 522), the Supremes
recognized this, and articulated a doctrine of merger: the ADW merges into the murder, so the ADW canit be a felony triggering the felony-murder rule. Seems obvious?

Well, for the past 20 years, the Supremes have been cutting back on Ireland. There was a point where I thought that my little ADW hypo was the only piece of Ireland left. We had cases all over the place, with clearly inconsistent rules. Even the Supremes finally admit this. So they announce that they've decided to settle and clarify this area.

Run for the hills! It seems that every time the Supremes announce that they are going to
clarify and settle, they instead obfuscate and confuse. But not this time. They adopt a clear rule: When the underlying felony is assaultive in nature,... we now conclude that the felony merges with the homicide and cannot be the basis of a felony-murder instruction.i And a felony is assaultive based on the elements of the felony, not the facts of the case.

Pretty great. But wait, exactly what are assaultive felonies? Well, we can't expect everything; they decline to tell us. Certainly, PC 246, shooting at an occupied vehicle, is an assaultive felony, because the Supremes so state. This is a big win, how big remains to be seen.

People v. Chun; 2009 DJ DAR 4745; DJ, 3/31/09; Cal. Supremes

March 26, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: NO "CUSTODY" FOR MIRANDA PURPOSES AT WORK

The Defendant was instructed to follow police to room in office space where he worked while his office, home and car were being searched (with a warrant).

He was questioned with the door closed, but specifically told he was not under arrest, and that he would walk out when "we're done," but was not told he was free to leave.

The questioning was mostly friendly, though at one point the defendant asked the officer not to yell. Held, he was not in custody.

Was he really free to leave having been instructed (otherwise known as "ordered") to go to the office, placed in a closed room, and told he could leave "when we're done" (the converse of which is you can't leave until I am through with you)? Yeah, right.

United States v. Bassignani (9th Cir., 3/25/09, 07-10453) 09 C.D.O.S. 3766

March 26, 2009

FEDERAL WIRETAPPING AND STANDING

Even though the trial court erred in ruling that the Defendant did not have standing to complain of a violation of wiretap laws in the monitoring of her boyfriend's phone, which she also used, Defendant was not entitled to suppression because "Ms. Ahamad never sought a hearing based on the claim federal law enforcement authorities utilized the drug trafficking warrant as a stratagem to discover evidence relating to the shooting of Mr. Larrainzar.

Nor did Ms. Ahamad challenge the federal court disclosure orders which resulted in the Los Angeles homicide detectives learning of the ongoing federally authorized electronic surveillance."

People v. Reyes (2nd Dist., 3/24/09, B201294) 09 C.D.O.S. 3803

March 12, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: PROSECUTORS CAN'T APPEAL THEIR OWN DISMISSAL

Where prosecutors moved to dismiss misdemeanor charges against defendant due to lack of evidence after trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, prosecutors could not appeal adverse ruling on suppression motion.

People v. Gallagher - filed January 30, 2009, San Mateo Superior Court, Cite as 2009 SOS 1525

March 7, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: EVIDENCE THAT CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH A FELLOW GANG MEMBER IS NOT ENOUGH TO PROVE CRIMES WERE GANG RELATED

Appellant and his fellow gang member committed four robberies on Christmas Day 2000, the robberies resulting in minimal proceeds.

At trial, Briceno stipulated that Hard Times was a street gang and that on 12/25/2000, he actively participated in the Hard Times criminal street gang with knowledge that members have engaged in criminal gang activity, as defined in Penal Code section 186.22. He specifically did not stipulate that he aided and abetted another gang member on that date.

An expert testified generally as to the gang but provided no testimony establishing Briceno’s specific intent in committing the robberies. Briceno was convicted of the robberies with the gang enhancement. The federal appellate court found that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to find proof of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt as there was no showing that Briceno committed the crimes with the specific intent to promote the gang -- mere membership in a gang alone is insufficient to prove that the crime was for the gang’s benefit.

(Garcia v. Carey (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1099.) The court ordered the habeas petition as to imposition of the enhancements granted.


February 26, 2009

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES: Badly Fragmented' Forensic Science System Needs Overhaul;

National Academies Post warnings over forensic science problems. Click HERE for story.

February 24, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY, THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, AND CASUAL REMARKS

The California Supreme Court rules that admission of a statement made by a 3-year old, two months after the crime, failed to qualify as spontaneous, finding harmless error.

But they reject the claim that this violated the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. They take some language from Crawford (541 U.S. 36) that testimonial hearsay, admission of which violates the Sixth Amendment, doesn't include a casual remark made to an acquaintance. They say that the US Supremes haven't defined what testimonial means.

I assume that this was written before Davis (547 US 813), where the U.S. Supremes explained that testimonial means description of a previous event, as opposed to an
ongoing emergency. Under Davis, this statement is clearly testimonial.

Facetious remark (because I'm posting this on Saturday, and I stole it from Al Menaster)

Hey, let's pretend the later case never happened, so we can take some language from an earlier case to affirm a death sentence.

People v. Gutierrez; 2009 DJ DAR 2353; DJ, 2/20/09; Cal. Supremes

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February 24, 2009

JUDGE CAN ONLY GO SO FAR WHEN QUESTIONING WITNESSES

HERE'S AN OLDIE, BUT A GOODIE.

The trial court extensively cross-examined defense witnesses, repeatedly disparaged defense witnesses, and belabored points of evidence adverse to the defense. This was intervening by the court as an adversary to such an extent that it violated the rule that the trial court cannot align itself with the prosecutor.

People v. Santana (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1194
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February 23, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: ONE ROBBERY, HOW MANY VICTIMS?

How many counts can we come up with? One potato, two potato, three potato?

The defendants robbed a McDonald's. (OMG, why?) Two of the employees saw the robbers with guns and hid throughout the robbery. The robbers forced the manager to open the safe
and give the robbers the money, which hich had a tracking device which led the police to the defendants.

So is this three counts of robbery or only one? Of course, the Supremes say that it's three. Constructive possession, they say, yada, yada, yada. Just to show you how absurd this is, one defendant was sentenced to 116 years to life.

People v. Scott; 2009 DJ DAR 2347; DJ, 2/20/09; Cal. Supremes

February 7, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: OK FOR PROSECUTORS TO COMMENT ON DEFENSE FAILURE TO RETEST EVIDENCE

Here is yet another spectacularly awful case from the California Supreme Court relating to defense experts. In Zamudio (43 Cal.4th 327), the California Supreme Court said that the DA could present evidence that an item had been provided to the defense laboratory.

In this case, the DA repeatedly asked witnesses whether the sheriff's DNA lab could have been ordered to release samples to the defense for testing. Notably, the trial judge actually sustained defense objections, noting that this raised questions about the credibility and competency of defense counsel, a point the Supremes ignore.

The Supremes say these questions weren't a violation of work product, since no "writing" from the defense was involved. They brush aside claims of attorney-client privilege (no communication from a client), Griffin (380 U.S. 609) error (OK to comment on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence), and that the questions shifted the burden of proof to the defense.

This is really, really bad and we're going to have to develop strategies to deal with it. Of curse, we must all demand that the court pay for the retesting of evidence from the prosecution. But we need more...much more.

People v. Bennett; 2009 DJ DAR 1429; DJ, 1/30/09; Cal. Supremes

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February 5, 2009

JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE TESTIFYING DEFENDANT FAILING TO EXPLAIN OR DENY

JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE TESTIFYING DEFENDANT FAILING TO EXPLAIN OR DENY

I have always hated this instruction because nomatter how thorough a defense attorney is in the presentation of his/her case, the court always gived this and prosecutors always use it to muddy the very clear waters.

The California Court of Appeal upholds the CALCRIM on this, 361, relying on the cases upholding the CALJIC. The Court of Appeal finds evidentiary support for giving this instruction, but besides objecting to it, point out, if you can, that your client didn't fail to explain or deny anything.

People v. Rodriguez; 2009 DJ DAR 1474; DJ, 1/30/09; C/A 2nd, Div. 4
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February 2, 2009

U.S. SUPREME COURT: MIGHT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE BE ELIMINATED?

I'm scared. I'm very, very scared. While I have always championed personal financial sanctions on police officers who violate the Fourth Amendment rather than exclusion of evidence (seems a stronger deterrent to me), the courts have historically thought otherwise. Now, if a cop violates your Fourth Amendment rights, the evidence he subsequently learns of as a result of the illegal search or seizure is suppressed and cannot beused in court against you.

Will our chief justice, who championed such causes in the past, lead the Supremes to total expungement of Fourth Amendment remedies?

Take a look at the URL below. Maybe so.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/31/washington/31scotus.html?_r=1


January 29, 2009

ATTEMPT CRIMES IN CALIFORNIA REQUIRE MORE THAN MERE PREPARATION

Attempt Crimes in California Still Require an Unequivocal Act beyond Mere Preparation

By Ted Cassman & Raphael Goldman

A recent decision of the California First District Court of Appeal provides a welcome refresher course concerning the crime of attempt. The case reinforces the principle that an attempt under California law requires more than mere preparation to commit a crime – there is no offense except when the defendant commits an unequivocal act or acts that, unless frustrated by some external circumstance, would result in the accomplishment of the intended offense.

In People v. Luna, No. A119768, __ Cal. Rptr. 3d __, 2009 WL 106660 (Jan. 15, 2009), the court considered the case of Manuel Luna, who was found driving a car that contained piping, glue, fittings, butane, a butane burner and approximately $1200 in cash – that is, all of the things necessary to manufacture hashish except for one crucial ingredient: “grocery bags full of marijuana.” Id. at * 1. Luna testified at trial that he bought the equipment with the intention of manufacturing hashish, but claimed that he never attempted to purchase marijuana after acquiring the equipment. Id. Luna was convicted under Penal Code § 664 of attempting to manufacture hashish in violation of Health & Safety Code § 11379.6.

“The elements of a criminal attempt are “[(1)] a specific intent to commit the crime, and [(2)] a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.” Id. at *2 (citing Penal Code § 21a; People v. Toledo 26 Cal. 4th 221, 229 (2001)). The Luna court observed that the first element was not in question because the appellant testified that it had been his intention to manufacture hashish when he purchased the equipment. Id. Thus, the key dispute [wa]s the second component of an attempt crime. That is, whether appellant’s actions had progressed to the point where they could be considered a direct but ineffectual act done towards [the crime’s] commission, i.e., an overt ineffectual act which is beyond mere preparation yet short of actual commission of the crime. Id. (quotation marks omitted, second alteration in original).

The Luna court noted the principle that “[w]here the intent to commit the crime is clearly shown, an act done toward the commission of the crime may be sufficient for an attempt even though that same act would be insufficient if the intent is not as clearly shown.” Id. at *3 (quoting People v. Bonner, 80 Cal. App. 4th 759, 764 (2000)). Nonetheless, even under that minimal standard, the court found evidence against Luna to be insufficient to support the attempt conviction.

The case turned on the question of whether Luna’s acts were merely preparation to commit a crime, or instead constituted a course of conduct that would have resulted in the commission of a crime absent some external intervention. The Luna court relied heavily on guidance from the California Supreme Court distinguishing mere preparation from acts that constitute attempt:

Continue reading "ATTEMPT CRIMES IN CALIFORNIA REQUIRE MORE THAN MERE PREPARATION" »

January 25, 2009

CONTRA COSTA PUBLIC DEFENDER CHALLENGES DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S USE OF ILLEGAL CLIENT RECORDINGS

Public defender challenges DA's use of jail phone conversations
By Malaika Fraley
Contra Costa Times
Posted: 01/25/2009 04:49:29 PM PST

MARTINEZ — Contra Costa County's top public defender says the District Attorney's Office is illegally using conversations recorded at jail pay phones to build criminal cases against defendants.

Public Defender David Coleman will go before a Contra Costa County judge Thursday to argue against prosecutors' use of phone calls in a challenge both sides say could ultimately make its way to higher courts.

Coleman contends that the District Attorney's Office's practice of listening to jail phone calls to gain information in criminal cases violates constitutional rights, state wiretapping laws and attorneys' professional codes of conduct. The district attorney's office says the practice is supported by legal precedent and calls Coleman's case "groundless."

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January 9, 2009

NO PRE-PRELIMINARY HEARING PITCHESS DISCOVERY

NO PRE-PRELIMINARY HEARING PITCHESS DISCOVERY

Out top appellate counsel in the California criminal defense community are litigating whether the right to pre-prelim. discovery survived Prop. 115, and we thought this case might resolve it. But nope. Instead, they hold that we can't ever get Pitchess (11 Cal.3d 531)
discovery prior to prelims.

They say that it's "unlikely" that Pitchess discovery would actually affect the prelim., which is merely a limited probable cause hearing. But what if we could make a showing that in
this particular case it IS likely that disclosure of citizen complaints against the police officers would cause the preliminary hearing magistrate to refuse to hold the defendant to answer or find a lesser?

You know, like when I found out that San Diego Police Officer Broxterman was removed from the DUI enforcement unit and then suddenly reappeared ten years later making the same illegal traffic stops that got him into trouble ten years prior? And the prosecutors didn't tell us about it? ANd now he is gong to testify n my prelim about a traffic stop and other (false) stuff, and I can't impeach him with the conplaints about him? hhhh. Hush. Hush.

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We still can't get discovery? What kind of rule is that? In any event, they can't now seriously claim that they are preserving testimony at this limited hearing where we can't find out much beforehand. California Public Defense Association appellate guru Mark Harvis is appellate counsel on this one. His writ petition was summarily denied the first time, after which the Cal. Supremes granted review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal. Mark will petition the Supremes again.

People v. Galindo; 2009 DJ DAR 313; DJ, 1/9/09; C/A 2nd, Div. 8


January 1, 2009

THE POLICE CAN'T KEEP THE ONLY COPIES OF SEALED SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS

The Cal. Supremes here decide when the police can retain all the copies of a sealed Hobbs (7 Cal.4th 948) search warrant affidavit. Their answer effectively bars this.

To obtain an order to retain all copies, the police have to show that disclosure would endanger an informant, that security procedures at the clerk's office are inadequate, that police security procedures are adequate, that the police have procedures to ensure retention of the affidavit for 10 years, and the magistrate must make a sufficient record of the documents reviewed to make sure that later on everyone can tell what was reviewed.

That didn't happen here, so letting the police keep all the copies was error.

And when are the police EVER going to be able to show that the clerk's office leaks like a sieve? Never.

So what happens to this defendant? The Supremes find that it's not impossible to reconstruct what happened here. So they remand for a full hearing to determine whether meaningful appellate review of the actual affidavit is in fact possible. If not, apparently the
warrant gets quashed. The police can't keep the only copies of sealed search warrant
affidavits any more, and we can still seek suppression if what was in those affidavits can't be reconstructed.

People v. Galland; 2008 DJ DAR 18856; DJ, 12/30/08; Cal. Supremes

January 1, 2009

FAILURE TO ADVISE A DEFENDANT OF ALL OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS-CASE REVERSED

The officer here engaged in an extensive discussion with the defendant about his Miranda rights, mostly about advisements by police on television and the fact that the defendant had previously been advised of his rights.

The defendant waived and confessed. Oops, the officer left out one teeny tiny right, that anything the defendant said could be used against him.

The trial judge, of course, had no problem with this. imagine that.

Surprisingly, the Court of APpeal does have a problem with it. The defendant has to actually be advised of each of the four Miranda warnings, or the subsequent confession is no good. The AG argued harmless error, but the Court of Appeal disagrees and reverses.

People v. Bradford; 2008 DJ DAR 18881; DJ, 12/31/08; C/A 1st

December 23, 2008

POSSESSING MANY ITEMS OF CHILD PORN; HOW MANY COUNTS?

The defendent here possessed 46 items of child porn in 38 "containers" (disks, tapes, hard drives, etc.). So of course the DA filed 46 counts of PC 311.11, possession of child porn.

The Court of Appeal says that this is only one count, not 46. The fact that there were different containers doesn't matter.

People v. Manfredi; 2008 DJ DAR 18662; DJ, 12/23/08; C/A 5th

November 27, 2008

ARANDA/BRUTON, CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT, AND CRAWFORD

ARANDA/BRUTON, CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT, AND CRAWFORD

There are a bunch of issues in this case. First, Aranda (63 Cal.2d 518) and Bruton (391 U.S. 123) bar use of an out-of-court statement made by a non-testifying co-defendant against another defendant (absent effective redaction).

Some of the statements here were redacted. But one wasn't: the co-defendant's statement that he and the defendant went looking for the guy their friend had a fight with. Of course, they
killed that guy. The Court of Appeal, incredibly, says that admission of this statement didn't violate Aranda/Bruton because the Court of Appeal finds this statement isn't "powerfully incriminating because it facially" incriminated the defendant; it wasn't "direct" evidence that the perpetrators intended to assault or kill the victim. Right; and it was admitted for what purpose?

Second issue: the defendant's standoff with SWAT. The Court of Appeal says that resistance to arrest, like flight, is admissible to show consciousness of guilt. But wait, the defendant had
two other uncharged shooting incidents for which he might have been resisting arrest. Too bad, they can't reward a pro over a neophyte with only one offense. Of course, this makes consciousness of guilt nonsense; what if he was guilty of two offenses but not guilty of this
one?

Third issue: Crawford (541 U.S. 36) bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless we get to confront the declarant. But what if the hearsay isn't testimonial? Well, Smith (135 Cal.App/4th 914) says that the constitutional restriction on nontestimonial hearsay is the old Ohio v. Roberts (448 U.S. 56) rule which was overruled by Crawford with respect to testimonial hearsay: is the statement sufficiently reliable?

The Court of Appeal claims that the recent Davis (547 U.S. 813) case from the US Supremes wipes Smith out. WRONG. Where the hearsay really is nontestimonial, due process should require that the hearsay meet a reliability requirement.

People v. Garcia; 2008 DJ DAR 16901; DJ, 11/17/08; C/A 4th

Continue reading "ARANDA/BRUTON, CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT, AND CRAWFORD" »

November 22, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: DISCRETIONARY FINDING RESULTING IN SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION MUST BE

DISCRETIONARY FINDING RESULTING IN SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION MUST BE
MADE BY A JURY

We actually FINALLY win an Apprendi (530 U.S. 466) issue. The jury acquitted this defendant of the only sexual offense charged against him. But the court made a finding that on the offenses where the defendant was convicted, he committed them for purposes of sexual gratification, permitting the discretionary order of sex registration under PC 290.

Apprendi says that any fact that increases the "penalty" for a crime must be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Does a finding that offenses were committed for sexual gratification, resulting in the Jessica's Law residency restriction, increase the penalty for the crime?

This Court of Appeal says yes. They do an extensive analysis about why the Jessica's Law
residency requirement is punitive and conclude that the necessary finding can't just be made by the judge.

Great case, which I suspect the Supremes won't let stand.

People v. Mosley; 2008 DJ DAR 17178; DJ, 11/21/08; C/A 4th

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: DISCRETIONARY FINDING RESULTING IN SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION MUST BE " »

October 18, 2008

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE-GANG MURDER CASE DISMISSED

This is an amazing case. But, alas, it has been granted review, so it's probably not long for this world.

Here, the victim showed up at the house where gang guys were hanging out. Someone asked, "where are you from?" A fist fight ensued with the eventual shooter, the victim, and the
two defendants. The victim left. The shooter produced a gun and killed the victim.

The defendants were also convicted. The Court of Appeal reversed on insufficiency of the evidence! The Court of Appeal emphasized that the defendants didn't know the shooter even had a gun and did nothing to encourage the shooter to shoot the victim. The Court of Appeal refused to rule that every gang fight permits a conclusion that it's reasonably foreseeable that a killing will result.

People v. Medina; formerly at 153 CA4th 610; rev. granted

October 10, 2008

RECORDING JURY INSTRUCTIONS; CUSTODY FOR POSSESSION; REOPENING JURY

RECORDING JURY INSTRUCTIONS; CUSTODY FOR POSSESSION; REOPENING JURY
SELECTION

The judge got the parties to stipulate that the court reporter didn't have to write down the jury instructions. It turned out that there were all sorts of problems with the instructions the jury was actually given.

The Court of Appeal makes it pretty clear that they want jury instructions reported. So when your judge pressures you to stipulate, note this case.

Of course, the Court of Appeal finds no actual error here, even with the DA not available (he's a judge now) and defense counsel not recalling lots of stuff.

Here's the second issue. The defendant ran over and killed the victim while the defendant was stealing the victim's son's car. Did the victim have sufficient actual or constructive possession over the car to qualify as a victim of a robbery?

The Court of Appealsays yes, saying, get this, that the victim need only have "loose custody" over the property, and the victim's connection to the car was sufficient here. Love that loose
custody.

And there's yet a third issue.Third issue. Both sides passed on the exercise of peremptory challenges. The court then reopened jury selection and permitted the DA to use a peremptory challenge. This Court of Appeal says that a court can reopen jury selection on finding good cause, and that good cause should be liberally construed and of course here that means the Court of Appeal upholds the reopening.

People v. DeFrance; 2008 DJ DAR 15595; DJ, 10/10/08; C/A 3rd


Continue reading "RECORDING JURY INSTRUCTIONS; CUSTODY FOR POSSESSION; REOPENING JURY " »

September 3, 2008

CALIFORNIA DUE PROCESS TRAVESTY

HARMLESS CUNNINGHAM ERROR

The court imposed upper term based on the victims being particularly vulnerable, but the defendant didn’t admit that nor did the jury find that fact. And so the sentencing must be reversed as a violation of Cunningham (549 U.S. 270), right?

Nope. They find harmless error: a jury would have found that the victims were particularly vulnerable. Hey, just deny the defendant a jury trial on everything and then affirm by finding that any jury would have convicted anyway.

Why do we bother with these troublesome juries?

People v. Esquibel; 2008 DJ DAR 13876; DJ, 9/3/08; C/A 2nd, Div. 8

August 29, 2008

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER NEWS: USING RAP SHEETS TO PROVE PRIORS

USING RAP SHEETS TO PROVE PRIORS?

The DA used CLETS rap sheets to prove up the defendant's convictions. Does admission of rap sheets violate Crawford (541 U.S. 36), which bars use of testimonial hearsay unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross examine?

This Court of Appeal says no. They assure us that rap sheets aren’t testimonial, because they aren’t created to use as testimony, they’re just compilations of statistical data.

Of course, pure statistics wouldn’t establish the details of the prior convictions, needed to prove
that the priors qualify.

The Court of Appeal then says that the DA would end up having multiple witnesses to prove up the many levels of hearsay which appear in rap sheets, and might not even be able to figure out what witness should be called.

The Court of Appeal seems to think that this logic supports their point; if you think about it, it clearly wholly undermines their point. It is precisely the unreliable, many levels of hearsay that makes use of rap sheets a violation of the confrontation clause.

People v. Morris; 2008 DJ DAR 13699; DJ, 8/29/08; C/A 4th

August 6, 2008

CALIFORNIA FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL MAKES BIZARRE RULING ON USE OF PRIOR ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Here is a close runner up as "Outrage of the Week." The Courts seem to be getting more and more bold in violating the rules of evidence and defendants' Constitutional rights.

The DA got to present prior domestic violence evidence under California Evidence Code sec. 1109 on count one. The Court of Appeal struggles to justify this, because the count doesn't really charge a domestic violence offense. So they say is sort of does. Huh?

That's bad enough. But then they say that the prior domestic violence evidence comes in on count two, which is clearly not a domestic violence charge, because 1109 uses the word "action," meaning, get this, that if 1109 evidence comes in on one count, it comes in on EVERY OTHER COUNT in the "action" to prove guilt. So if the DA can smuggle a sex offense (Evidence Code sec. 1108) or a domestic violence offense into the information, they get to
use prior sex offenses or domestic violence offenses to prove guilt on, say the murder or robbery.

Objection! Relevance? Overruled on the grounds that we must make the prosecutor win!

People v. Dallas; 2008 DJ DAR 12225; DJ, 8/6/08; C/A 4th

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL MAKES BIZARRE RULING ON USE OF PRIOR ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE" »

August 4, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE OUTRAGE OF THE WEEK: ACQUITTAL VACATED BY DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO VOLUNTEER THE WHEREABOUTS OF COMPLAINING WITNESS!

This case absolutely defies logic and supports the weirdo proposition that defense attorneys have to assist prosecutors when they lose their witnesses. You've got to be kidding!

Okay, so in this case, the DA got to the end of his case. But there was no victim to put on to support counts 3 and 4. The judge granted a dismissal on those counts pursuant to Penal Code sec. 118.1 granted.

The defendant informed his lawyer that he knew where the victim was and wanted her called on the remaining counts. Hide and seek! The court was outraged, and vacated its 1118.1 dismissal, resuscitating the dismissed counts.

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Ironically, the jury acquitted on counts 3 and 4. So, then, why the outrage?

But the California Court of Appeal is outraged at this malfeasance by the defendant. He's estopped from claiming double jeopardy because of forfeiture by wrongdoing.

This is an extreme case: the court claimed the defendant intentionally interfered with the trial process with his incredibly transparent ploy. If you're scratching your head, join the group. What, exactly, did the defendant do wrong? When the DA announced that he couldn't find the victim, was the defendant supposed to jump up and announce that he knew where she was?

Has the C/A heard of the 5th Amendment?

So, when the prosecutors lose their witnesses next time, make sure you get up and give them directions. This is just another example of judges trying to help inept prosecutors.

People v. Pearson; 2008 DJ DAR 12035; DJ, 8/4/08; C/A 2nd, Div. 6

July 30, 2008

PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN REBUTTAL EVIDENCE IN PENALTY

This case is extremely long, with more prosecutorial misconduct (shocking!), judicial limitations on defense evidence, and juror misconduct than in any cases we have seen for a long, long while.

Let's focus, however, on the permissible scope of character evidence by the DA rebutting your character evidence. The Supreme Court says that if you present overall good character evidence in penalty, the DA can rebut using evidence of similar scope.

But they restate Rodriguez (42 Cal.3d 730, 792, fn. 24); the scope of rebuttal must
be specific and must relate directly to a particular incident or character trait the defendent offers.

People v. Loker; 2008 DJ DAR 11540; DJ, 7/28/08; Cal. Supremes

Continue reading "PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN REBUTTAL EVIDENCE IN PENALTY " »

July 2, 2008

THE PROSECUTION CAN PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT A DEFENSE LAB EXAMINED EVIDENCE

THE PROSECUTION HAS THE RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT A DEFENSE LAB
EXAMINED EVIDENCE-RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES TO DEFEAT THIS HORROR

This case was reported in this blog a few months ago. Here, the DA was permitted to repeatedly present evidence from the police criminalists that crucial evidence was released to a defense lab.

The California Supreme Court rejected a defense work product argument. They then rejected the 6th Amendment challenge by saying that their work product ruling disposed of all those
challenges.

A great many criminal prominent criminal defense lawyers petitioned the court to delete or modify this discussion.

The Supremes modified their opinion with a phrase. It looks like what they are saying is that
since no constitutional issues were raised, the only constitutional issues presented are those at issue inherent in the work product issue, and so rejection of the work product
issue is also a rejection of any constitutional issue presented by the
work product issue.

If that sounds like gibberish, you got it. If this actually comes up, raise challenges based on the 5th and 6th Amendments, the attorney-client privilege, work product, and relevancy, as well as EC 352.

People v. Zamudio; 2008 DJ DAR 8604; DJ, 6/13/08; Cal. Supremes

April 22, 2008

CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE - TESTIMONY RE: EVIDENCE BEING SENT TO DEFENSE LABORATORY

A Police expert testified that she did not test blood on a ring because it would have consumed it in case it had to be tested again, and that the evidence had been "released to a defense lab." Defense counsel objected, but not on the grounds raised on appeal.

Held, even if claims are cognizable, the testimony did not violate the work product privilege as it applies to criminal cases (only "core" work product protected; see Garcia v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 63, fn. 2).

The Court refuses to reach constitutional issues regarding the admission of the testimony because trial counsel did not object on constitutional grounds, leaving a writ of Habeas Corpus open on that issue.
.
People v. Zamudio (Ca. Sup. Ct., 4/21/08, S074414) 08 C.D.O.S. 4544

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE - TESTIMONY RE: EVIDENCE BEING SENT TO DEFENSE LABORATORY" »

April 18, 2008

CALIFORNIA RESTITUTION - UNDOCUMENTED CLAIMS OF LOSS

People v. Gemelli (C.A. 4th, 4/18/08, E043682) 08 C.D.O.S. 4598

A victim's "bare, unverified" statement of losses is sufficient to sustain an order for direct restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f). This court disagrees with People v. Vournazos (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 948.

The defendant's testimony refuting amounts did not have to be believed.

March 31, 2008

SAN DIEGO DUI DEFENSE: TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ADMITTED EVIDENCE IN DUI RE-TRIAL

in a well-reasoned, but unexpected move by the California Fourth District Court of APpeal, DIvision One, the Court reversed a DUI conviction because the trial court let in "evidence" that it should not have.

In a DUI case where the jury in the first trial acquitted defendant for a "per se DUI" (driving with BAC of .08 or more) offense but could not reach a verdict regarding defendant's generic DUI offense, conviction for generic DUI in a second jury trial is reversed where collateral estoppel principles were violated in: 1) permitting the second jury to consider the issue of whether defendant drove with a BAC of .08 or more; and 2) instructing the jury that a BAC of .08 or more creates a permissive presumption of a "generic DUI" offense when the jury should have been instructed to presume defendant's BAC level was less than .08

People v. Smith, No. D049993

Continue reading "SAN DIEGO DUI DEFENSE: TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ADMITTED EVIDENCE IN DUI RE-TRIAL" »

March 30, 2008

SHAKEN BABY SYDROME DEBUNKED BY US RESEARCHERS

Shaken Baby Syndrome - A Flawed Theory?

New medical evidence highlighted in a BBC television programme could clear childminder Keran Henderson, who is serving a three-year prison sentence after being convicted of shaking an 11-month-old girl to death.

A mother-of-two and a former Scout leader, Keran, 43, has always insisted she did not harm Maeve Sheppard.

But the jury at her trial last November heard a succession of expert witnesses swear that Maeve suffered injuries to her brain and bleeding in the eyes indicating shaken baby syndrome.

There is already deep disquiet about the case. Two jurors said they believe there was a miscarriage of justice.

A prosecution witness also expressed doubts and Keran's husband Iain, a former policeman of Iver Heath, in Buckinghamshire, wrote in The Mail on Sunday last month that the conviction relied solely on the conflicting views of paid "experts".

But a BBC investigation revealed new research that suggests the science behind shaken baby syndrome is flawed and that the 15-20 convictions every year in the U.K. involving the diagnosis may be unsafe.

The prevailing-wisdom is that the syndrome is proved by a "triad" of symptoms including brain swelling and bleeding to the retina and the surface of the brain.

But BBC reporter John Sweeney has spoken to experts in the U.S. whose new research could demolish the basis for the diagnosis.

Dr Chris Van Ee, professor of biomechanics at Wayne State University in Detroit, claims tests with crash dummies and corpses show that falling off a sofa does far more damage than shaking.

He showed the BBC a test in which a dummy representing a one-year-old child generated a force of 109 times the acceleration due to gravity when dropped from a sofa on to its head.

When Sweeney shook a dummy the force was only 7G, less than a pillow fight.

Dr Van Ee said: "10Gs is a rocket launch, and here we have 110Gs for a fall off the sofa. That could be a fatal impact.

"Shaken baby syndrome is fundamentally flawed from a biomechanics perspective."

Meanwhile, North Carolina pathologist Dr Pat Lantz found retinal bleeding in the eyes of one in six corpses he studied.

This suggests that bleeds in the eye are more common than thought and therefore can't be proof of shaken baby syndrome.

Some medics suggest retinal bleeding can be due to attempts to resuscitate. Keran tried to give Maeve mouth-to-mouth.

The scientific doubts will be the basis for an appeal against Keran's conviction - and potentially for dozens more appeals.

But the challenge will be fiercely resisted by Maeve's heartbroken parents Mark and Ruth, who have two surviving children.

Mr Sheppard said: "We got what we thought was a fair verdict. We have a little girl who points up to our photographs and says "Who's that?" and we tell her it's Maeve.

"In 18 months, Keran Henderson will go home to a loving husband and two loving children - I will never have Maeve back."


Continue reading "SHAKEN BABY SYDROME DEBUNKED BY US RESEARCHERS" »

March 21, 2008

CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY REVERSED FOR RIGHT TO USE "LINGERING DOUBT" EVIDENCE

LINGERING DOUBT AND EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT THE SHOOTER

The California Supreme Court previously reversed this death case solely on penalty.

At the retrial, the trial judge took the position that since the jury had found the defendant guilty and found a personal use of a firearm true, the jury had found that the defendant must have been the shooter. The retrial judge thus barred any evidence that the defendant wasn't the shooter, even though the defense had lots of evidence that the former co-defendant was
the actual shooter.

The California Supreme Court reversed. They restate the principle of lingering doubt and hold that the defense has the right to present evidence casting doubt on the defendant's role. There is a concurring opinion saying that a case to the contrary has been effectively overruled.

People v. Gay; 2008 DJ DAR 3805; DJ, 3/21/08; Cal. Supremes

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY REVERSED FOR RIGHT TO USE "LINGERING DOUBT" EVIDENCE" »

February 3, 2008

SAN DIEGO DUI DEFENSE: BREATHALYZER TESTS ARE AN INACCURATE MEASUREMENT OF BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT

A group of judges in New Hampshire was served several alcoholic drinks as part of an experiment that was intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Breathalyzer. One judge was given so many drinks that he became visibly intoxicated. When the judge blew into the Breathalyzer, the machine registered a score of 0.0. After a few more tries, the Breathalyzer gave the same result. Following the demonstration, at least one police jurisdiction in the state ceased using the Breathalyzer in favor of blood tests. (See Margaret Graham Tebo, New Test for DUI Defense, ABA Journal (Feb. 2005).)

The Breathalyzer is by far a less accurate test than a blood test. A blood test actually measures blood alcohol concentration (BAC). But a Breathalyzer merely estimates it. It measures "breath" alcohol concentration, and requires a difficult mathmatical conversion to correlate it to a "blood" alcohol concentration.

What the Breathalyzer attempts to measure is the presence of chemicals found in alcohol. But the machine often measures chemicals with molecular structures similar to those found in alcohol. There are, in fact, there are numerous chemical compounds that can fool a Breathalyzer machine.

intox.jpg

According to Dr. David Hanson, Over 100 compounds can be found in the human breath at any one time, and 70 to 80 percent of them contain [a] methyl group structure and will be incorrectly detected as ethyl alcohol. (See David Hanson, Ph.D., Breath Analyzer Accuracy, at http://www2.potsdam.edu/hansondj/DrivingIssues/1055505643.html.) As a result, false positives can occur for a plethora of reasons.

Body chemistry is one factor that can lead to false positives. People with diabetes, acid reflux disease, or some cancers can fail Breathalyzer tests even if their bloodstreams are perfectly free of alcohol. Diabetics, for example, have extraordinarily high levels of acetone, a substance that some breath machines mistake for ethyl alcohol.

Police recognize that regurgitation can render unreliable the results of a Breathalyzer. Thus, most departments require that the arresting officer observe the subject of a breath test for a period of time prior to administerting the test. In California, police should watch the suspect for at least fifteen minutes to make sure he or she did not burp, hiccup or regurgitate prior to applying the test. Regurgitation includes any instance of fluids or gases that rise through the esophagus.

In 2004, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled inadmissible the results of a breath test where the defendant presented evidence of gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). In People v. Bonutti, 817 N.E.2d 489 (Ill. 2004), the defendant had blown a BAC of 0.174 after being stopped and showing outward signs of intoxication. Defendants motion to suppress the Breathalyzer evidence was granted because the court found that the results could have been compromised by a silent, unobservable episode of reflux.

Two years ago, when I attended the Intox 8000 Certification seminar in New Orleans (the San Diego Police Department had just implemented the machine), I was able to get a Fort Lauderdale judge who was acting as a guinney pig for us to blow a .20 breath alcohol level using the Intox 8000 machine. His true blood alcohol level at the time was .02 (he had one drink in him). I got the machine to measure a breath alcohol concentration of ten times the actual true blood alcohol level. How? I just manipulated the machine and the judge's breathing techniques.

If you think I can do this, imagine the flawed results an inexperienced cop might use against you?

Continue reading "SAN DIEGO DUI DEFENSE: BREATHALYZER TESTS ARE AN INACCURATE MEASUREMENT OF BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT" »

January 31, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAWYER NEWS: REFUSING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS DURING CROSS EXAMINATION

The co-defendant testified at the suppression motion (Penal Code sec. 1538.5), to facts which would have made the police search illegal.

But the co-defendant refused to answer some things on cross examination.

The Court of Appeal says that striking the co-defendant's testimony was the correct sanction here.

Funny how they don't want to do that when the DA's witness (usually the cop) refuses to answer our questions in cross.

People v. Seminoff; 2008 DJ DAR 1613; DJ, 1/31/08; C/A 4th

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January 29, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER NEWS: THE MOST BIZAARE KIDNAPPING FOR RAPE CASE - EVER

This case could conceivably become one of the most widely read cases in California. It's crazy. It's juicy. It's XXX-Rated. It's really, really weird.

The Court of Appeal begins by saying, "This is not your garden variety kidnapping and rape case." No kidding.

The victim, Jane Doe, started getting threatening letters, saying the writer of the letters would "fuck up" the victim's family if she didn't comply. With what? With engaging in a truly staggering array of sexual acts with Michael, a co-worker.

Michael claimed he was getting similar letters. Michael told Jane that Tiffany, another coworker, was writing these letters, that Tiffany was psycho, and that they had to comply to avoid having Jane's family being hurt.

Over a seven-month period, and that's not a typo, Jane submitted to a variety of sexual acts with Michael, many of them videotaped (so Tiffany could be sure that Jane was complying,
see?).

The footnotes quoting the letters are beyond X-rated; the funniest part is where the letters say that Jane should make the sex more romantic.

Finally Michael went on vacation, Jane went to the police, and the police immediately realized that Michael was sending the letters. He of course copped out.

The issue is whether there's enough evidence for kidnapping for rape. Yep, the court says there was sufficient movement, since Michael took Jane to the parking lot of a nearby cemetery to engage in many of the sexual acts.

A cemetery parking lot? This guy really was romantic
.

People v. Power; 2008 DJ DAR 1036; DJ, 1/23/08; C/A 4th

Cemetery1.jpg


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January 29, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE NEWS: FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STRIKES DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY AT SUPPRESSION MOTION AFTER TELLING DEFENDANT IT CAN BE USED AGAINST HIM AT TRIAL: SAY WHAT?

The California Fourth District Court of Appeal holds in this bizaare case that it was not error to strike the defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing where the prosecutor on cross examination went into the merits of the case, not just the search issue, as to how the defendant came to know about the marijuana and what she intended to do with it because it was relevant to her credibility on the suppression motion.

The defense counsel invoked the Fifth Amendment on cross examination, so the trial court struck her testimony. No alternative to striking the testimony was offered by the defense.

People v. Seminoff, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 144 (4th Dist. January 29, 2008):

The prosecutor then asked her if she intended to sell the marijuana, and that prompted the same objection from defense counsel. Again, the court overruled the objection. It warned defense counsel that unless Bassett answered the prosecutor's questions, the court would strike her testimony in its entirety. The court then took a short break to allow defense counsel to converse with Bassett.

When the hearing resumed, defense counsel said Basset was willing to proceed with cross-examination on a question-by-question basis. He also indicated that, based on the court's previous rulings, she was willing to answer questions about whether she intended to sell the marijuana.

However, when the prosecutor asked her that question, defense counsel objected on both relevancy and Fifth Amendment grounds. In overruling the objections, the court stated “cross-examination should be allowed to reveal whether or not, among other things, [Bassett] has a coherent credible story about the events involved, whether or not she can remember details, whether or not she has an interest in the outcome.”

The court also told defense counsel that if Bassett continued to invoke her privilege against self-incrimination, it would have no choice but to strike her testimony. When defense counsel responded that Bassett was not going to answer the prosecutor's questions about the marijuana, the court did just that.

Comment: This case does not even cite Simmons that a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing cannot be used at the trial unless the defendant testifies contrary to it. Here, the trial judge told the defendant that her testimony could be used against her at trial. This case is strange and unsupported under the Fifth and Fourth Amendments, and should be reviewed by the California Supreme Court.

But it won't. It should, at least, be depublished.

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE NEWS: FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STRIKES DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY AT SUPPRESSION MOTION AFTER TELLING DEFENDANT IT CAN BE USED AGAINST HIM AT TRIAL: SAY WHAT?" »

January 19, 2008

AL MENASTER'S TAKE ON PEOPLE V. HUA-EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES DON'T EXIST TO BREAK INTO A HOUSE FOR A LITTLE GRASS

I can't help but laugh when I review Los Angeles Public Defender Al Menaster's commentary on new California criminal cases. Here's the newest comenatry on People v. Hua, which I posted earlier in the week. Clikc HERE to see that post.

Menaster's commentary:

In Welsh v. Wisconsin (466 US 740), the US Supremes held that the exigency exception to the requirement that the police have a warrant in order to enter a home applies only where the crime being investigated isn't minor.

In Welsh, the crime was driving under the influence; the US Supremes held that this crime was too minor to permit invasion of a home without a warrant.

Of course, the Cal. Supremes upheld entry of a home based on exigent circumstances for a DUI, saying that in Cal., a DUI was so much more serious than a DUI in Wisconsin. Right...

Anyway, this case involves a police entry into a home to investigate the serious crime of, drum roll please, possession of less than one ounce of marijuana. Even this C/A can't stomach this one. They apply Welsh and hold that the entry can't be justified by exigent circumstances.

People v. Hua; 2008 DJ DAR 409; DJ, 1/14/08; C/A 1st

January 16, 2008

CALIFORNIA GANGS:WHAT IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE MEMBERSHIP?

IT DOESN'T TAKE MUCH TO PROVE YOU ARE A MEMBER OF A GANG

Evidence of tattoos on the defendant's head, and admissions to police, were sufficient for the jury to find active membership in a gang. The fact that the robbery was committed with another gang member was sufficient to prove the robbery was committed "in association with" the gang.

People v. Martinez (C.A. 4th, 1/15/08, G038150) 08 C.D.O.S. 614

yakuza-gang-in-japan.jpg

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January 9, 2008

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL HOLDS CUNNINHAM ERROR IS HARMLESS

The Court of Appeal here admits that the reliance by the trial court about facts relating to the crime as the justification for imposition of the upper term in prison violated Cunningham (127 S.Ct. 856), since those facts weren't found true by the jury.

They then find harmless error. How? Well there was all this evidence in support of the aggravating factors found by the judge. This is just so, so wrong. If the judge denies a
defendant a jury trial, can the resulting conviction be affirmed on the basis that the evidence was so overwhelming that a jury would have convicted anyway? Wrong.

People v. Curry; 2008 DJ DAR 201; DJ, 1/9/08; C/A 3rd

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL HOLDS CUNNINHAM ERROR IS HARMLESS" »

January 9, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER NEWS: SURREPTITIOUS BUGGING OF DEFENDANTS IN A HOLDING CELL DOES NOT VIOLATE MIRANDA

The two defendants in this case both invoked Miranda after their arrests. Those cunning
police put the two into a cell and left. But they bugged the cell. Of course, the defendants had a conversation where they made incriminating statements. Guess they don't watch T.V.

The Court of Appeal rejects the claim that this violated Miranda. The Court of Appeal rules that the police didn't interrogate these guys. The Court of Appeal also rejects a challenge based on Crawford (541 U.S. 36), finding that the statements weren't testimonial, since the defendants wouldn't have thought their statements might be used at a later trial.

People v. Jefferson; 2008 DJ DAR 215; DJ, 1/9/08; C/A 2nd, Div. 7

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January 8, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAWYER NEWS: CALIFORNIA COURTS CANNOT USE PRISON PRIORS TO ADD TIME AND CHOOSE UPPER TERM

DUAL USE OF PRISON PRIORS IN CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL CASES-REJECTEDThe court here imposed the upper term based on the defendant's priors. The court used those very same priors as prison priors under PC 667.5(b) to add time as well.

Question: Does this violate the dual use ban?

The Attorney General argues that the upper term was based on the fact of the priors, while the extra time for the prison priors was based on the fact that the defendant had served time in prison.

This Court of Appeal correctly recognizes the Supreme Court authority rejecting this distinction. (See, Jones, 5 Cal.4th 1142.) The California Penal Code sec.667.5(b) enhancement IS based on the fact of the prior conviction. Therefore, the trial judge couldn't add time twice for the same priors.

People v. McFearson; 2008 DJ DAR 156; DJ, 1/8/08; C/A 5th

December 27, 2007

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL REVERSES CALIFORNIA MURDER CONVICTION

People v. Le (2007) , Cal.App.4th
[No. H030808. Sixth Dist. Dec. 27, 2007.]

A jury found appellant guilty of the second-degree murder of his wife's lover and also found true an allegation that he had personally used a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code §§ 187, 12022, subd. (b).)

The trial court sentenced him to a state prison term of 15 years to life. Appellant contended, "The trial court erred in instructing under CALCRIM No. 917 that mere 'words' cannot establish a defense to battery, and in permitting the prosecutor to argue to the jury, over objection, that 'words' cannot legally constitute 'provocation' to reduce a homicide to manslaughter."

Appellant further contended that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument and that the trial court erred in responding to a jury question.

The Court of Appeal reversed.

December 21, 2007

CALIFORNIA MEDICAL MARIJUANA CONVICTION REVERSED:COP DIDN'T HAVE EXPERTISE FOR HIS OPINION

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER NEWSPeople v. Chakos, No. G037004

In this case where the defendant had a formal certificate from his doctor for lawful marijuana consumption under the Compassionate Use Act which allowed him to possess up to eight ounces of marijuana, his conviction for possessing six ounces of marijuana for sale was reversed.

The court held that the record lacked any substantial evidence that the arresting officer had any expertise in differentiating citizens who possess marijuana lawfully for their own consumption, as distinct from possessing unlawfully with intent to sell.

Here are some quotes for future cases to use when your cop claims to be an expert and, in fact, isn't:

"Indeed, Cormier's lack of expertise in distinguishing lawful from unlawful possession is revealed in some of his own testimony. He laid great stress on the fact that about a quarter ounce of marijuana was found in Chakos' backpack when he was arrested. And, of course, intuitively, such a precise amount would seem consistent with drug dealing, since it represents ease of packaging: take an ounce, divide by half, divide each of those halves by half. (Hence Cormier's reference in his testimony to "amounts consistent with pricing, quarters, eighths.")"

"But what are we to make of Cormier's percipient testimony that Chakos was found to have irregular amounts found in his closet? Merely taking Deputy Cormier's own testimony at face value, a reasonable trier of fact might infer that the irregular amounts of marijuana were inconsistent with dealing and were consistent with lawful use under the Compassionate Use Act. Such an inference also seems intuitive because, while marijuana may be lawfully possessed under the Compassionate Use Act, it is not exactly easily obtainable in open, licit circumstances (as would the pharmaceuticals in Dross in the normal context where they would be distributed lawfully)."

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA MEDICAL MARIJUANA CONVICTION REVERSED:COP DIDN'T HAVE EXPERTISE FOR HIS OPINION" »

December 21, 2007

HEARSAY ADMISSIBLE AT CALIFORNIA PROBATION REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS

People v. Abrams, No. B194835

The Defendant's prison sentence imposed following probation revocation proceedings on a charge of petty theft with prior convictions is affirmed. The issue in this case was whether or not information that the defendant has reported to his probation officer or made monetary payments to the officer are essentially non-testimonial. The court held that even if the statements are hearsay, they are admissible at a probation violation hearing.

December 18, 2007

VAGUE THREAT TO KIDS IS "FALSE IMPRISONMENT BY MENACE"

Telling young children that if they did not comply "I will do something" constituted evidence of implied threat to harm them. There was ample evidence of menace to support the convictions for felony false imprisonment."

People v. Aispuro (C.A. 5th, 12/18/07) F052506, 07 C.D.O.S. 14435

December 12, 2007

VIDEOTAPE OF DUI SUSPECT'S DRUNK DRIVING ARREST DOESN'T SUPPORT ARREST FOR DUI

Long, long ago, San Diego DUI defense lawyers began getting videotapes of our clients' DUI stops. As soon as law enforcement learned that San Diego DUI defense attorneys were winning cases by using these tapes (because the cops did just about everything wrong) they stopped using them. SO much for justice. The same goes for DUI arrests in Texas. See below:

The Texas DUI suspect was stopped and the officer smelled alcohol. The officer's patrol car video was not admitted at the hearing, but the trial court saw it.

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In the first appeal, the videotape was not in the record, and the court affirmed, Amador v. State, 187 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006), but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed because of the lack of the video in the record. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 667-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A five minute portion was certified by the trial court as what it saw, and it did not include the field sobriety test that defendant allegedly failed. The video thus did not support probable cause. Reversed. Amador v. State, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 9675 (Tex. App. — Beaumont December 12, 2007).


December 11, 2007

SAN DIEGO DUI DEFENSE LAWYER NEWS: DUI MURDER CASE UPHELD BY COURT OF APPEAL

In this case, the Defendat was convicted by jury trial of second degree murder (PC §187), failing to stop at the scene of an injury accident (VC §20001(a), (b)(1)), failing to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in property damage (VC §20002(a)), reckless driving causing great bodily injury with a prior conviction (VC §23104(b)), driving with a suspended license (VC §14601.2(a)) and being under the influence of a controlled substance (H&S Code §11550(a)).

The trial court committed him to state prison for a term of 15 years to life for the murder count consecutive to a three-year upper term for the VC §20001 count.

On appeal, the Defendant contended that (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to modify the implied malice instruction upon his request, (2) his trial counsel was prejudicially deficient in failing to request modification of the voluntary intoxication instruction, (3) the trial court prejudicially erred in excluding evidence of def.’s good character, and (4) the imposition of an upper term violated def.’s right to a jury trial on any aggravating circumstance.

In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Defendant repeated his claim that his trial counsel was prejudicially deficient in failing to request modification of the voluntary intoxication instruction.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not make any prejudicial instructional or evidentiary errors, the Defendant's trial counsel was not prejudicially deficient, and the trial court did not violate the Defendant's constitutional rights in imposing the upper term.

The Defendant was convicted of “driving impaired” in October 1989 and again in December 1990. In 1991, def. completed “driving while impaired classes.” Defendant also completed traffic school three times. He attended an eight-hour “live class” in March 1998 and again in January 2001, and took an “on-line course” in January 2003. These classes covered the issue of impairment as a result of using drugs and driving and “conveyed” the message that driving under the influence of drugs was dangerous.

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Continue reading "SAN DIEGO DUI DEFENSE LAWYER NEWS: DUI MURDER CASE UPHELD BY COURT OF APPEAL" »

December 6, 2007

NEW CALIFORNIA DUI LAWS WILL SNAG MORE CALIFORNIA DUI PROBATIONERS WITH FALSE EVIDENCE

A new California law aimed at raising the penalties for DUI will require all people on probation for a California DUI to take a Preliminary Alcohol Screening test (PAS) if lawfully detained for suspicion of a new DUI. If the person's blood alcohol level is .01 percent or greater, it's back to the big house.

Doesn't the state legislature know by now that these roadside PAS tests historically post false results? Do we really need more false convictions using junk science? Must we stuff the courts with violations of the probation condition "do not drive with any measurable alcohol in your system" when those little roadside handheld machines historically read alcohol that isn't there?

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Maybe we can get this undone before it goes into effect in 2009? AB 1165 (Maze) will locate its new 0.01 violation in CVC 23154. Look for it in 2009.

Here's the script:

SEC. 5. Section 23154 is added to the Vehicle Code, to read:
23154. (a) It is unlawful for a person who is on probation for a
violation of Section 23152 or 23153 to operate a motor vehicle at any
time with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.01 percent or greater,
as measured by a preliminary alcohol screening test or other chemical
test.
(b) A person may be found to be in violation of subdivision (a) if
the person was, at the time of driving, on probation for a violation
of Section 23152 or 23153, and the trier of fact finds that the
person had consumed an alcoholic beverage and was driving a vehicle
with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.01 percent or greater, as
measured by a preliminary alcohol screening test or other chemical
test.
(c) (1) A person who is on probation for a violation of Section
23152 or 23153 who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his
or her consent to a preliminary alcohol screening test or other
chemical test for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol
in the person, if lawfully detained for an alleged violation of
subdivision (a).
(2) The testing shall be incidental to a lawful detention and
administered at the direction of a peace officer having reasonable
cause to believe the person is driving a motor vehicle in violation
of subdivision (a).
(3) The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to,
or the failure to complete, a preliminary alcohol screening test or
other chemical test as requested will result in the suspension or
revocation of the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a
period of one year to three years, as provided in Section 13353.1.


Continue reading "NEW CALIFORNIA DUI LAWS WILL SNAG MORE CALIFORNIA DUI PROBATIONERS WITH FALSE EVIDENCE" »

December 4, 2007

NINTH CIRCUIT FINDS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF "SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME"

On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider in light of Carey v. Musladin (2006) 127 S.Ct. 649, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal panel stands by its decision that no rational trier of fact could have found that the petitioner caused the child's death.

In this case, the prosecution experts' opinion that shaking caused death was "wholly unsupported" by the physical evidence.

Smith v. Patrick (9th Cir. 12/4/07, 04-55831) 07 C.D.O.S. 13785

December 4, 2007

CALIFORNIA "SHAKEN BABY" MURDER CASE REVERSAL UPHELD

SAN FRANCISCO (AP) - A federal appeals court that last year overturned the conviction of a woman accused of shaking her grandson to death has upheld its decision.

Shirley Ree Smith was convicted in December 1997 and was sentenced to 15 years to life at a women's state prison in Chowchilla.

During her trial, experts for both sides gave conflicting testimony about the 7-week-old boy dying from being shaken, from sudden infant death syndrome or from an old brain injury that re-bled.

After reviewing that evidence, a three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals decided that shaken baby syndrome "was wholly unsupported by the physical evidence" and overturned Smith's conviction.The state appealed, sending the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which urged the federal appeals court to review the case again.

On Tuesday, it reaffirmed its decision.

Smith v. Patrick, 2007 DJ DAR 17841, DJ, 12/5/07

Continue reading "CALIFORNIA "SHAKEN BABY" MURDER CASE REVERSAL UPHELD" »

December 2, 2007

BALTIMORE MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED FOR USE OF FAULTY BULLET EVIDENCE

A Murder Conviction Torn Apart by a Bullet
In a 1995 Maryland Case, Key Testimony and the Science Behind It Have Been Discredited

By John Solomon
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, November 19, 2007; Page A01

Former Baltimore police sergeant James A. Kulbicki stared silently from the defense table as the prosecutor held up his off-duty .38-caliber revolver and assured jurors that science proved the gun had been used to kill Kulbicki's mistress.

"I wonder what it felt like, Mr. Kulbicki, to have taken this gun, pressed it to the skull of that young woman and pulled the trigger, that cold steel," the prosecutor said during closing arguments.

Information from Joseph Kopera, who worked as a firearms expert for the Maryland State Police, was used to convict James A. Kulbicki of murder.

Prosecutors had linked the weapon to Kulbicki through forensic science. Maryland's top firearms expert said that the gun had been cleaned and that its bullets were consistent in size with the one that killed the victim. The state expert could not match the markings on the bullets to Kulbicki's gun. But an FBI expert took the stand to say that a science that matches bullets by their lead content had linked the fatal bullet to Kulbicki.

The jurors were convinced, and in 1995 Kulbicki was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his 22-year-old girlfriend. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

For a dozen years, Kulbicki sat in state prison, saddled with the image of the calculating killer portrayed in the 1996 made-for-TV movie "Double Jeopardy."

Then the scientific evidence unraveled.

Earlier this year, the state expert committed suicide, leaving a trail of false credentials, inaccurate testimony and lab notes that conflicted with what he had told jurors. Two years before, the FBI crime lab had discarded the bullet-matching science that it had used to link Kulbicki to the crime.

Now a judge in Baltimore County is weighing whether to overturn Kulbicki's conviction in a legal challenge that could have ripple effects across Maryland. The case symbolizes growing national concerns about just how far forensic experts are willing to go to help prosecutors secure a conviction.

"If this could happen to my client, who was a cop who worked within this justice system, what does it say about defendants who know far less about the process and may have far fewer resources to uncover evidence of their innocence that may have been withheld by the prosecution or their scientific experts?" said Suzanne K. Drouet, a former Justice Department lawyer who took on Kulbicki's case as a public defender.

Prosecutors are fighting to uphold Kulbicki's conviction, arguing that there is still plenty of evidence that proves his guilt.

"While much of the evidence against the petitioner falls into the category of circumstantial evidence, the state presented a mountain of evidence, both direct and circumstantial," prosecutors argued in a motion earlier this year opposing Kulbicki's request for a new trial.

Police had lots of circumstantial evidence. A jacket with the victim's blood on the sleeve was found hanging in Kulbicki's closet. And four bone chips and a bullet fragment were found in his truck. Tiny drops of blood also were found in the truck, and one spot of blood on the holster of his off-duty weapon. But the blood spots were so small and their quality so poor that they could not be matched to the victim.

Continue reading "BALTIMORE MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED FOR USE OF FAULTY BULLET EVIDENCE" »

November 12, 2007

NO EX POST FACTO VIOLATION FOR EXTENDING THE DATE DUI PRIORS CAN BE USED AGAINST DEFENDANTS

The defendant pled to DUI which, at the time, was priorable for 5 years. During those 5 years, the period the prior could be used was changed from 5 years to 7 years. The defendant reoffended more than 5 but less than 7 years later.

The facts just described come from Sweet, 207 CA3d 78.

In this case, the priorable period went from 7 years to 10. The Court of Appeal relies on Sweet and rejects the ex post facto challenge. They reject the claim that Stogner (539 US 607) changes this result.

They also reject estoppel and the claim that this violated the plea agreement. The defendant here may have some action here if he can show that the he actually relied on the period that the priors would be good.

People v. Forrester; 2007 DJ DAR 16782; DJ, 11/12/07; C/A 2nd, Div. 6

November 12, 2007

CALIFORNIA COURT DEFINES MAKING A PLACE AVAILABLE FOR STORAGE OR DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

California Health & Safety Code sec. 11366.5(a) makes it a crime to make a place available for use in manufacturing, storage, or distribution of controlled substances.

This Court of Appeal engages in a lively and exciting discussion of active verbs, and ends up concluding that 11366.5(a) can be violated only by a third party using the
property, not by the defendant who is cultivating marijuana himself and using his own property to store the marijuana.

People v. Dillon; 2007 DJ DAR 16777; DJ, 11/12/07; C/A 1st

October 31, 2007

SAN DIEGO JUDGE JOHN EINHORN REVERSED AGAIN

In yet another reversal fro San Diego Judge John Einhorn, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One, said because the prosecution did not fully utilize Penal Code section 1334 et seq. (Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from without the States in Criminal Cases) by requesting that a witness be taken into custody even though the witness had made it clear she would not appear, it did not show due diligence.

San Diego Judge John S. Einhorn erred in allowing the government to introduce prelim testimony. What, Judge Einhorn helps the prosecution to convict a defendant? Sound familiar? We can always count on Judge Einhorn to help the prosecution (unless the prosecution is being prosecuted, like his dear friend Mr. Loganbach).

Code of Civil Procedure section 1219, subdivision (b), which restricts the court's power to use incarceration to compel testimony of a sexual assault victim does not affect the court's power to order that a victim of a sexual assault be brought before it or seek that the witness be taken into custody.

People v. Cogswell (C.A. 4th, 10/31/07, D049038) 07 C.D.O.S. 12668

October 31, 2007

SAN DIEGO JUDGE JOHN S. EINHORN REVERSED IN SEX CASE

Because prosecution did not fully utilize Penal Code section 1334 et seq. (Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from without the States in Criminal Cases) by requesting that witness be taken into custody even thought the witness had made it clear she would not appear it did not show due diligence and San Diego Judge John S. Einhorn erred in allowing the government to introduce testimony.

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California Code of Civil Procedure section 1219, subdivision (b), which restricts the court's power to use incarceration to compel testimony of a sexual assault victim does not affect the court's power to order that an alleged victim of a sexual assault be brought before it or seek that the witness be taken into custody.

People v. Cogswell (C.A. 4th, 10/31/07, D049038) 07 C.D.O.S. 12668