January 18, 2010

CALIFORNIA SENTENCING LAW: ENHANCEMENTS AND MINIMUM PAROLE ELIGIBILITY

The defendant here was convicted of attempted premeditated murder. He got a 25 years-to-life enhancement under California Penal Code sec. 12022.53 for firing a gun causing great bodily injury. He also got a minimum parole eligibility of 15 years, under PC 186.22(b)(5). Relying on Brookfield (47 Cal.4th 583), the California Court of Appeal holds that the defendant can't get BOTH the GBI enhancement and the minimum parole eligibility term; he gets the former, not the latter. Oh well. C'est la Gare.

People v. Gonzalez; 2010 DJ DAR 551; DJ, 1/13/10; C/A 2nd, Div. 8

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January 18, 2010

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER: RESTITUTION FOR COSTS AT KAISER

At Kaiser Permanente, you pay a membership fee, then you pay only a token amount for medical services, less than the actual costs of those services. The defendant here injured the victim, who got treatment at Kaiser. The trial court rdered no restitution. The DA wants restitution for the full amount Kaiser claimed. The California Court of Appeal must order payment for the actual services provided, even though the victim didn' actually pay
for them. But it s not the full amount claimed. Kaiser had agreed to accept a lesser amount as payment in full; that's the amount to be ordered.

People v. Duong; 2010 DJ DAR 673; DJ, 1/15/10; C/A 1st, Div. 3

January 16, 2010

CALIFORNIA C RIMINAL LAW: PROVING OUT-OF-STATE PRIORS

PROVING OUT-OF-STATE PRIORS
The def.is sentence here was doubled because of an Alabama prior. For
that prior to qualify as a strike, the "face of the record" had to show
infliction of great bodily injury by the def. on someone other than an
accomplice. The C/A assures us that the document at issue here, a copy
of an original certified copy of the indictment, qualifies as face of
the record. Remember, even if a crime isnit on the PC 1192.7(c) serious
felony list, it can still be a strike prior if the "face of the record"
shows conduct thatis on the list.

People v. Skiles; 2010 DJ DAR 541; DJ, 1/13/10; C/A 4th, Div. 3

January 14, 2010

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: MULTIPLE SENTENCES FROM A SINGLE ACT

Penal Code section 654 bars multiple sentences from a single act. Here, the defendant was convicted of theft and burglary, the target of the burglary being the theft. Obviously, California Penal Code 654 applies, so the trial court sentenced the defendant on the burglary and deferred sentencing on the theft.

This California Court of Appeal struggles over precisely how 654 is to be implemented, and concludes that the trial court is to impose sentence on the burglary, and then impose and stay execution of the sentence on the theft.

People v. Alford; 2010 DJ DAR 627; DJ, 1/14/10; C/A 3rd

December 23, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAWYER MARY PREVOST: RESTITUTION FOR THE COSTS OF INVESTIGATION

RESTITUTION FOR THE COSTS OF INVESTIGATION

There are some good cases on why courts can't order restitution for the costs of investigation or prosecution. (Baker, 39 Cal.App.3d 550; Torres, 59 Cal.App.4th 1.)

This California Court of Appeal throws this settled area into confusion, claiming that as part of the court's power to devise probationary conditions, the costs here of determining whether the trash involved hazardous waste and cleaning up that waste could be ordered paid as a condition of probation.

The California Court of Appeal claims to distinguish Baker and Torres, saying that in those cases, the order was for potentially unlimited costs and here it was limited to a specific amount. Huh?

People v. Tarris; 2009 DJ DAR 17767; DJ, 12/23/09; C/A 4th, Div. 2

December 14, 2009

LAW OFFICES OF MARY PREVOST: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN ATTORNEY FAILS TO ADVICE ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES?

I'm not quite sure why this case is published. California Penal Code sec. 016.5 requires the court to advise a def. of potential immigration consequences of a plea. The 1016.5 advisement was given here. The California Court of Appeal rules that the def. can't get relief under 1016.5 when 1016.5 was complied with. They also rely on the recent Kim case (45 Cal.4th 1078) to reject other challenges by this defendant to his plea.

People v. Limon; 2009 DJ DAR 17333; DJ, 12/14/09; C/A 5th

October 26, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER: NO COUNTY JAIL FOR JUVENILES

The 18-year old here was filed on in juvenile court for criminal conduct done while he was a juvenile. The juvenile court ordered him held in county jail pending the adjudication hearing, and
then imposed a disposition of a year in the county jail. Right, we're
rehabilitating these kids by locking them up in jail.

The Court of Appeal correctly concludes that the minor should not have been detained in county jail pending adjudication, and should not have had a disposition of county jail imposed on him. They hold that county jail is not an available juvenile court dispositional alternative.

In re Ramon M
.; 2009 DJ DAR 15115; DJ, 10/26/09; C/A 4th, Div. 3

October 13, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: TRIPLING LIFE SENTENCES? NO!

TRIPLING LIFE SENTENCES

The defendant here got life without parole (LWOP); tripled! Hey, he had many strike priors. The Court of Appeal says that the strike law provides for doubling of determinate terms and the minimum terms of indeterminate sentences. The same rule applies here. Since the sentence was indeterminate, it doesn't get tripled.

People v. Coyle; 2009 DJ DAR 14737; DJ, 10/13/09; C/A 3rd

October 12, 2009

San Diego DUI Defense: San Diego Saved from First Time Ignition Interlock Requirements in DUI cases.

San Diego Dui Offenders will be spared the requirement of installing Ignotion Interlock Devices in their cars if they are convicted of a first offense.

Governor Swartzenegger signed a bill requiring first time offenders in Sacramento, Alameda, Tuare and Los Angeles counties to install ignition interlock devices.

What is so strange about this bill is that it omits the majority of counties, including San Diego, Orange, Riverside, etc...

We can expect a substantial equal protection challenge from criminal defense attorneys in the counties where this requirement takes effect in January.

For more, see: http://www.mercurynews.com/news/ci_13539936

October 8, 2009

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: CONSENSUAL LEWD ACTS CAN STILL REQUIRE MANDATORY SEX REGISTRATION

Here is another Hofsheier (27 Cal.4th 1185) case, this one a loss. In Hofsheier, the California Supreme Court struck down the mandatory sex registration requirement for California penal Code sec. 288a, consensual oral copulation with a minor (16 in that case) as violative of equal protection, because consensual sex with that same minor (Penal Code 261.5) doesn't mandate Penal Code 290 sex registration.

This case involves mandatory registration for violation of Penal Code 288(c)(1), lewd acts with a minor 14 or 15 by a person more than 10 years older.

Here are the Court of Appeal's reasons for saying Hofsheier doesn't apply. First,
288(c)(1) requires specific intent! Right, you can certainly have consensual sex with a minor without any intent to do so. Second, the requirement that the def. be more than 10 years older somehow justifies distinguishing Hofsheier. Third, 288(c)(1) victims are 14 or 15, while the victim in Hofsheier was 16. Right. Huh?

So does this mean that every person who has sexual conduct with a person who is 14 or 15, when the defendant is 10 or more years older, is required to register, no matter what
form that sexual conduct may take? There is thus no group of people who commit this offense who are not required to register, unlike the Hofsheier situation, where oral cop was registrable but intercourse was not. Consequently, there is no group of "similarly situated" people who do not have to register.

Just to restate this, consensual sex or oral copulation with a 16-year old, no mandatory registration. Hugging a 15-year old with lewd intent, mandatory registration.

People v. Cavallaro; 2009 DJ DAR 14563; DJ, 10/8/09; C/A 6th

September 24, 2009

CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE, SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT VACATED

Trial court's imposition of enhanced sentencing on a defendant convicted of receiving stolen property while on a release from custody on his own recognizance (O.R.) is vacated as Penal Code section 1318 was not complied with in connection with defendant's release from custody and defendant did not commit a new felony while on an O.R. release. Therefore, since defendant's release did not qualify as an O.R. release under applicable law, the enhancement findings under section 12022.1 were not supported by the evidence

People v. Hernandez, No. F055430

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September 16, 2009

CALIFORNIA SEX CRIMES: FULL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES AND JESSICA'S LAW

FULL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES AND JESSICA'S LAW? NO

California Penal Code sec. 667.6(c) provides for full consecutive sentences for sex crimes. Until Jessica's Law was enacted, 667.6(c) said that the defendant got a full consecutive sentence for "each violation" of a specified sex offense, whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction.

Jessica's Law (Prop. 83), effective 11/8/06, repealed 667.6(c) and said instead that the defendant gets a full consecutive sentence for each crime involving the same victim on the same occasion. Clear, yes? Well, the AG argues here that the purpose of Jessica's Law was to strengthen the laws applicable to sex offenders, so the Court of Appeal should rewrite the statute to its previous version.

This Court of Appeal declines to do so, ruling that a general statement of intent can't overcome the express and clear statutory language.

People v. Goodliffe; 2009 DJ DAR 13697; DJ, 9/16/09; C/A 3rd

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August 17, 2009

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: CALCULATING INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE SENTENCES

CALCULATING INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE SENTENCES

This California Court of Appeal writes a screed about the unintelligibility of the determinate sentencing law. No kdding. What is more infuriating than trying to figure out sentencing in California?

They try to help folks make correct calculations, using the "box" analogy. The trial court computes all indeterminate sentences separately, and puts that in one box. The court then computes all determinate sentences separately, in another box, then adds the two boxes together. Hey, sometimes there are three boxes! What fun.

People v. Neely; 2009 DJ DAR 12077; DJ, 8/17/09; C/A 2nd, Div. 6

August 16, 2009

USE OF A WHIZANATOR PERMITS TERMINATION OF PROP 36 PROBATION-OOPS!

OK, tied for outrage of the week. The defendant here was on Prop. 36 probation. He used a whizanator device to produce fake urine during a drug test. Incredibly, over an excellent dissent, the California Court of Appeal rules that use of the whizanator isn't drug related and so permits termination of 36 without three chances. The majority says that this is preparing false evidence, violating California Penal Code sec. 134, and interferes with the peace officer, namely the probation officer, violating California Penal Code sec. 148. WHAT?

People v. Haddad; 2009 DJ DAR 11525; DJ, 8/7/09; C/A 2nd, Div. 5

August 10, 2009

MULTIPLE CRIMES, THE ONE-STRIKE SEX LAW, AND EX POST FACTO

A sentence for a crime can't be increased after commission of the
crime, because of ex post facto.

At the time of the first sex crime, California Penal Code sec. 784.7 required prosecution in the county where the crime occurred. 784.7 was then amended, and when the defendant committed the second sex crime, 784.7 permitted joining all sex crimes in any county where one was committed.

The defendant was charged under California Penal Code sec. 667.61, the one-strike sex
law, on the basis of being convicted of multiple offenses in one proceeding. So does ex post facto bar this? Nope, says this Court of Appeal, with incomprehensible reasoning.

Hey, the defendant was on notice about the 784.7 amendment when he did the second crime. Huh?

People v. Acosta; 2009 DJ DAR 11623; DJ, 8/10/09; C/A 4th

August 4, 2009

COURT MAY ONLY RELY ON PAST ACTS IN SENTENCING

When a court violates a defendant's probation and sends him to prison, the court can only rely on stuff that happened before the initial sentencing, not stuff that happened later. This is codified in Rule 4.435(b)(1). This Court of Appeal applies an exception to that rule.

The defendant's probation was violated then reinstated. His probation was violated a second time. The Court of Appeal holds that the judge may rely on the defendant's conduct between the initial sentencing and the first probation violation.

People v. Black; 2009 DJ DAR 11300; DJ, 8/4/09; C/A 4th

December 30, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE NEWS: 3-STRIKES SENTENCE STRUCK DOWN AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

The 9th circuit here strikes down a 3-Strikes sentence as being in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause!

The crime here is failure of a registered sex offender to re-register within 5 days of his birthday. The court stresses that the defendant had been registering, hadn't moved, and the police knew where he was all the time. They evaluate the crime as pretty minimal.

The defendant has many serious violent and sex offenses, but they say that nothing about THIS crime shows any recidivist tendencies. Thus, they conclude that 28 years to life
violates the cruel and unusual clause.

AND THAT, MY FRIENDS, IS A GREAT START!

Gonzalez v. Duncan; 2008 DJ DAR ; DJ, 12/ /08; 9th Cir. Fed C/A
http://www.tinyurl.com/7ohl4n

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November 22, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: DISCRETIONARY FINDING RESULTING IN SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION MUST BE

DISCRETIONARY FINDING RESULTING IN SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION MUST BE
MADE BY A JURY

We actually FINALLY win an Apprendi (530 U.S. 466) issue. The jury acquitted this defendant of the only sexual offense charged against him. But the court made a finding that on the offenses where the defendant was convicted, he committed them for purposes of sexual gratification, permitting the discretionary order of sex registration under PC 290.

Apprendi says that any fact that increases the "penalty" for a crime must be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Does a finding that offenses were committed for sexual gratification, resulting in the Jessica's Law residency restriction, increase the penalty for the crime?

This Court of Appeal says yes. They do an extensive analysis about why the Jessica's Law
residency requirement is punitive and conclude that the necessary finding can't just be made by the judge.

Great case, which I suspect the Supremes won't let stand.

People v. Mosley; 2008 DJ DAR 17178; DJ, 11/21/08; C/A 4th

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November 20, 2008

CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE: YOU CAN'T USE ONE PRIOR TWICE IN SENTENCING

The court used the same prior conviction to impose upper term and to impose an extra year under PC 667.5(b). What about the rule barring the use of a single fact twice? The DA's theory is that the upper term is based on the fact of the conviction, while the 667.5(b) year is based on
the fact that the def. served time in prison.

The Court of Appeal cites the cases which have already settled this issue. (e.g., Jones, 5 Cal.4th 1142), and concludes that the court can't do this.

People v. McFearson; 2008 DJ DAR 17096; DJ, 11/20/08; C/A 5th

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October 20, 2008

SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE: CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING AND APPRENDI

The U.S. Supreme Court this week heard argument on a case presenting the question of whether Apprendi (530 U.S. 466) applies to consecutive sentences.

In Cunningham (549 U.S. 270), the U.S. Supremes held that
Apprendi applies to California's upper term scheme. So can a judge impose a consecutive sentence based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant?

It looks like, from a review of all the pundits on the subject, that we will win this one. However, the California Supremes will also claim that somehow this doesn't apply in California, so we
won't get the benefit of this, until we get back to DC. Incidentally, check out (and subscribe to) the SCOTUS blog, a fabulous resource for U.S. Supreme Court stuff like this.

Oregon v. Ice; http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/

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October 13, 2008

POSSESSION OF DRUGS FOR SALE AND CONSPIRACY TO POSSESS DRUGS FOR SALE

In this case, the defendant possessed heroin and methamphetamine in his motel room. The DA charged and got convictions for two counts of drug possession for sale, and two counts of conspiracy to possess those drugs for sale (there was another guy involved).

The Court of Appeal says that a defendant can be convicted on only one count of conspiracy to possess drugs for sale, no matter how many kinds of drugs he has. Moreover, they rule that the defendant can't be sentenced for both possession for sale and conspiracy to possess the same drugs for sale.

You would think this is a no-brainer, but this defendant has strike priors, so Penal Code sec. 667(c)(6) applies. That section makes it mandatory to impose consecutive sentences for felonies not committed on the same occasion and not arising from the same set of operative facts.

The Court of Appeals holds that conspiracy doesn't end at the commission of the first overt act but is continuing, so the conspiracy and the possession for sale did arise from the same set of operative facts. Thus, 667(c)(6) doesn't require consec. sentences.

People v. Briones; 2008 DJ DAR 15641; DJ, 10/13/08; C/A 2nd, Div. 6


October 13, 2008

FAILURE TO ADVISE ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES DURING THE PLEA

FAILURE TO ADVISE ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES DURING THE PLEA

Penal Code sec. 1016.5 requires trial courts to advise defendants during the taking of a plea about possible immigration consequences. A failure to so advise requires the court to set the plea aside, on a showing that the defendant faces adverse immigration consequences and that prejudice resulted from the non-advisement.

In this case, the defendant was advised of immigration consequences at arraignment, but not during the plea several weeks later. The Court of Appeal says that the 1016.5 advisement must
be during the plea itself, not just on some other date.

The case is reversed and remanded to determine whether the defendant can show prejudice.

People v. Akhile; 2008 DJ DAR 15654; DJ, 10/13/08; C/A 1st

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September 4, 2008

NO MANDATORY SEX REGISTRATION FOR CONSENSUAL ORAL SEX WITH A 14-YEAR OLD

In Hofsheier (37 Cal.4th 1185), the California Supreme Court held that mandatory sex offender registration under PC 290 for consensual oral copulation with a minor 16 or 17 violated equal protection, because consensual sexual intercourse with such a minor didn’t trigger mandatory registration.

This Court of Appeal applies Hofsheier to hold that mandatory registration for Penal Code 288a(b)(2), consensual oral copulation with a 14-year old, also violates equal protection.

People v. Hernandez; 2008 DJ DAR 13935; DJ, 9/4/08; C/A 2nd, Div. 2

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September 3, 2008

CALIFORNIA DUE PROCESS TRAVESTY

HARMLESS CUNNINGHAM ERROR

The court imposed upper term based on the victims being particularly vulnerable, but the defendant didn’t admit that nor did the jury find that fact. And so the sentencing must be reversed as a violation of Cunningham (549 U.S. 270), right?

Nope. They find harmless error: a jury would have found that the victims were particularly vulnerable. Hey, just deny the defendant a jury trial on everything and then affirm by finding that any jury would have convicted anyway.

Why do we bother with these troublesome juries?

People v. Esquibel; 2008 DJ DAR 13876; DJ, 9/3/08; C/A 2nd, Div. 8